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NEGLIGENCE IN THE AIR:  THE DUTY OF CARE  
IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
DAVID HUNTER† & JAMES SALZMAN††
INTRODUCTION 
The past eighteen months have witnessed a remarkable surge of 
popular interest in climate change and its impact.  Sensitized by the 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the heavy hurri-
cane season through the Gulf states, the public has gained a new-
found appreciation for the remote-sounding predictions that global 
warming may increase severe storm activity.1  Timing is everything, 
and the recent releases of the disaster movie The Day After Tomorrow2 
and Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth3 have spurred wide-
spread interest from the workplace to the blogosphere over a topic 
that long seemed the exclusive province of tree-huggers and policy 
wonks. 
Indeed, just six years ago, soon after his election in 2000, Presi-
dent Bush reversed his campaign position on climate change and suf-
fered no political fallout.4  Since refusing to send the Kyoto Protocol 
to the Senate for ratification, the Bush administration has maintained 
a consistent policy of opposition to any “targets and timetables” or 
similar approach to climate change that would involve mandatory re-
duction or stabilization of greenhouse gases (GHGs).  Instead, the 
administration has called for voluntary commitments by industry and 
 †  Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. 
 †† Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law and Nicholas Institute Professor of Envi-
ronmental Policy, Duke University.  We are grateful for the helpful comments of Jamie 
Boyle, Doug Kysar, and Bob Rabin, as well as for the valuable research assistance pro-
vided by Eriade Hunter, AnneMarie Wall, Lawrence Watson, and David Wright. 
1 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change,  Hurricanes and Global Warming—Q & 
A, http://www.pewclimate.org/hurricanes.cfm (last visited May 1, 2007) (suggesting 
that global warming may exacerbate severe storm damage). 
2 THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW (20th Century Fox 2004). 
3 AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006). 
4 See Douglas Jehl with Andrew C. Revkin, Bush, in Reversal, Won’t Seek Cut in Emis-
sions of Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1 (discussing President Bush’s 
decision to no longer seek regulation of carbon dioxide emissions). 
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increased efforts in research and development.5  To date, this inaction 
at the federal level has not resulted in any clear political cost.  Indeed, 
during the 2004 presidential election, John Kerry deliberately avoided 
the topic of climate change—an issue focus groups apparently 
deemed too remote or politically damaging on which to run.6
While not making a noticeable difference at the ballot box, failure 
to take significant action at the federal level to address climate change 
concerns has triggered three significant responses.  The first has been 
increased corporate activity.  Companies have begun rebranding 
themselves to suggest a more climate-friendly agenda—such as British 
Petroleum’s new tag line “Beyond Petroleum”7—and a wide range of 
corporations are establishing corporate GHG reduction targets,8 while 
entrepreneurs look to profit from people’s desires to do something 
about the climate problem.9
The second response has taken the form of increased political ac-
tivity at the subnational level.10  Communities around the nation have 
5 See, e.g., The White House, Climate Change Fact Sheet (May 18, 2005), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050518-4.html (describing 
President Bush’s support for “voluntary, regulatory, or incentive-based programs on 
energy efficiency, agricultural practices, and greenhouse gas reductions”). 
6 See David L. Greene, Bush Seen as Polluter, but Kerry’s Plan Vague, BALT. SUN, Oct, 
17, 2004, at 1F (“Despite conservationists’ strong feelings about Bush’s record, envi-
ronmental concerns have been all but invisible in the presidential campaign, elbowed 
aside by Iraq and terrorism.”).  But see Amanda Griscom Little, How Green Was My Elec-
tion, GRIST, Nov. 9, 2006, http://grist.org/news/muck/2006/11/09/election (report-
ing that “the environment played a central role in some high-profile victories” in the 
2006 mid-term elections). 
7 See BP, Beyond Petroleum, http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId= 
9010219&contentId=7019491 (last visited May 1, 2007).  Chevron has changed its slo-
gan to the enigmatic “Human energy.”  See willyoujoinus.com, The Advertising, 
http://www.willyoujoinus.com/advertising (last visited May 1, 2007) (displaying Chev-
ron’s new advertising campaign); see also Steven Mufson, Exxon Mobil Warming Up to 
Global Climate Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2007, at D1 (discussing a possible shift by 
ExxonMobil toward acknowledging the scientific consensus that the climate is chang-
ing). 
8 See CLIMATE GROUP, CARBON DOWN, PROFITS UP 6-13 (2d ed. 2005) (providing 
an extensive list of corporate emissions targets). 
9 See, e.g., TerraPass Home Page, http://www.terrapass.com (last visited May 1, 
2007) (allowing consumers to  purchase carbon offsets for their car, flight, and 
home energy emissions); Chicago Climate Exchange Home Page, http:// 
www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited May 1, 2007) (providing a “voluntary, legally 
binding rules-based greenhouse gas emission reduction and trading system”). 
10 See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, LEARNING FROM STATE ACTION 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE:  JUNE 2006 UPDATE (2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/ 
document.cfm?documentID=548 (describing regional initiatives and state policies de-
signed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
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created climate action plans.11  States have joined the action, as well.  
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia require utilities to ob-
tain a specific percentage of their electricity from renewable sources, 
while Washington and Oregon require offsets for utilities’ greenhouse 
gas emissions.12  California has taken the strongest actions, requiring 
greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced to 1990 levels by 2020.13  And 
seven northeastern states have joined together in the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI)—a regional strategy that mandates a ten 
percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from electric power 
generators by 2019.14
The third response to federal inaction has come through in-
creased litigation, including legal actions brought by environmental 
groups, tobacco class action attorneys, municipalities, state attorneys 
general, and others.  Some litigation has focused on suits against pub-
lic bodies.  For example:  Massachusetts and eleven other states sued 
the EPA under the Clean Air Act to require the agency to regulate 
carbon dioxide as a pollutant;15 cities and environmental groups filed 
suit against the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 
demanding that it produce environmental impact statements consid-
ering the climate impacts of its loans;16 and representatives of the Arc-
tic Inuit people filed a petition against the United States government 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.17  Most of 
these cases are still pending, although the Supreme Court recently 
reached a decision in the plaintiffs’ favor in Massachusetts v. EPA.18
11 See, e.g., Mass. Climate Action Network, Sample Municipal Climate Action Plans, 
http://www.massclimateaction.org/plans.htm (last visited May 1, 2007) (providing 
links to climate action plans for communities in Massachusetts and other states). 
12 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 10, at 6. 
13 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 sec. 1, pt. 3, § 38550, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West Supp. 2007); see also Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-
05 (2005), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/executive-order/1861 (mandat-
ing an additional reduction to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050). 
14 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding in Brief, 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_brief_12_20_05.pdf (last visited May 1, 2007). 
15 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
16 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
17 Martin Wagner & Donald M. Goldberg, An Inuit Petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights for Dangerous Impacts of Climate Change (Dec. 15, 
2004) [hereinafter Inuit Petition], available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ 
COP10_Handout_EJCIEL.pdf. 
18 127 S. Ct. at 1462 (“EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines 
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some rea-
sonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine 
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Likely far more important in the future will be tort actions filed 
against private parties.  We are aware of four such cases thus far, but 
observers (including the organizers of this Symposium) expect the 
number to increase significantly.19  If successful, these and future cases 
will have a huge impact on the industries sued and, as hopeful lawyers 
have mused, could make the tobacco litigation look small by compari-
son.20  For example, the most recent case—filed in September 2006 by 
the Attorney General of California against six major car manufactur-
ers—requests damages for, among other things, “such future mone-
tary expenses and damages as may be incurred by California in con-
nection with the nuisance of global warming.”21  That could be a 
whopper of a check, but will the case succeed? 
As law students all dutifully learn in their first-year Torts classes, a 
prima facie negligence claim must satisfy four elements:  duty, breach, 
causation, and injury.22  Our sense is that most of the discussion and 
analysis of climate change cases to date have focused on the third and 
fourth elements.23  In terms of causation, for example, how can plain-
tiffs persuasively link the particular emissions of cars driven in Cali-
whether they do.”). 
19 Tomas Kellner, Hurricane Tort, FORBES.COM, Sept. 29, 2005, http:// 
www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2005/1017/052.html. 
20 Vanessa Houlder, Climate Change Could Be the Next Legal Battlefield, FIN. TIMES 
(London), July 14, 2003, at 10 (quoting one lawyer as claiming “[t]he potential com-
pensation for climate change impacts would make the tobacco pay-outs look like pea-
nuts”).
21 Complaint at 14, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06CV05755 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter California Complaint]. 
22 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjmain C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and 
the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658 & n.1, 659 & nn.3-5 (2001) 
(citing caselaw, treatises, and casebooks that adopt the four elements). 
23 See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9-33 (2003) (discussing the effects of cli-
mate change that could substantiate claims for damages and the challenges of showing 
causation); Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change 
Litigation Against Corporate Defendants, 35 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2365, 2369 (Nov. 12, 2004) 
(“Causation is the crucial issue for defendants because it will be the most difficult for a 
plaintiff to demonstrate . . . .”); see also Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05 CV 
436 LTD RHW, 2006 WL 1066645, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006) (“I foresee daunting 
evidentiary problems for anyone who undertakes to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the degree to which global warming is caused by the emission of greenhouse 
gasses; the degree to which the actions of any individual oil company, any individual 
chemical company, or the collective action of these corporations contribute, through 
the emission of greenhouse gasses, to global warming; and the extent to which the 
emission of greenhouse gasses by these defendants, through the phenomenon of 
global warming, intensified or otherwise affected the weather system that produced 
Hurricane Katrina.”). 
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fornia with reduced snowpack in the Sierra Nevada?  And even if a 
causal link can be established between the offending action and the 
harm, what is the proper measure of the car companies’ liability in the 
face of multiple sources of greenhouse gases over an extended time 
period? 
These are challenging issues, and surely deserve careful attention.  
What remains surprising, though, is that little beyond passing mention 
has been written about the first two elements of negligence—the duty 
of care and its breach.  Suppose one could establish that emissions 
from a utility company or an automobile manufacturer’s cars proxi-
mately caused greater storm surges that, in turn, harmed a particular 
coastal community, or proximately caused reduced snowpack that led 
to water shortages for a specific farming community.  Key questions 
would still remain.  Did the utility or car manufacturer owe a duty of 
care to these specific communities?  If so, what was the nature of that 
duty and was it breached? 
To improve our understanding of the short-term and long-term 
potential for climate change tort litigation, this Article focuses on 
these first two elements of a tort action—the duty of care and its 
breach.  Part I addresses general doctrine.  What role does the duty of 
care play in tort actions?  Part II then explores the likely scenarios for 
climate-based tort actions, including a summary of the tort-based ac-
tions brought thus far.  Who are the likely plaintiffs and defendants?  
How have litigants attempted to satisfy the duty of care elements in 
climate litigation?  The final Parts assess the duty of care for a range of 
tort actions—negligence (Part III), products liability (Part IV), and 
private and public nuisances (Part V)—that may in the future form 
the basis of climate-based claims. 
I. DUTY OF CARE 
As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains,24
[t]he word “duty” is used . . . to denote the fact that the actor is required 
to conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk that if he does not 
do so he becomes subject to liability to another to whom the duty is 
owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which that actor’s con-
duct is a legal cause. 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).  Prosser and Keeton similarly 
define duty as “an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to con-
form to a particular standard of conduct toward another.”  W. PAIGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 356 (5th ed. 1984). 
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Parsing this definition, the duty element can be seen to imply two 
separate questions:  (1) to whom is the duty owed?, and (2) what does 
the duty entail?  Put another way, a successful plaintiff must demon-
strate that the defendant “was obligated to the plaintiff to take care to 
avoid causing the type of injury plaintiff suffered.”25
In most negligence cases, the answer to both questions is related 
to the foreseeable risks under the circumstances.  The general duty 
owed is to act reasonably under the circumstances (i.e., not to create 
unreasonable risks), and that duty is owed to those who are foreseea-
bly at risk from the defendant’s behavior.  In many tort cases, the an-
swers to these questions are clear, and neither the litigants nor the 
judge need dwell on them.  Consider, for example, a driving accident.  
Drunk is driving down the road after downing a six-pack and hits By-
stander, who is minding her own business waiting for a bus.  It goes 
without saying that Drunk (1) owes a duty to bystanders (2) not to 
drive on the sidewalk.  For this reason, the duty element is often con-
flated with the related question of breach of duty.26
The duty of a driver to pedestrians and other motorists is obvious.  
But as the links of causation (and thus the foreseeability of the injury) 
become attenuated, the analysis of duty also becomes more compli-
cated.  To modify our example above, assume that while driving down 
the road, Drunk is pulled over for driving under the influence.  Tow 
Truck Driver arrives to pick up Drunk’s car and is injured when hit by 
a passing car.  Drunk’s driving clearly was negligent, and if she had 
struck someone while driving she surely would have been liable.  But 
does she owe a duty to Tow Truck Driver for his injuries?27  Or imag-
ine if Drunk, while weaving down the road, notices in her mirror that 
Victim, standing on the side of the road, is suffering a heart attack, 
but she keeps driving.  Does Drunk owe a duty to Victim?28
25 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 22, at 698. 
26 Indeed, there is currently an effort to write duty almost entirely out of the Re-
statement (Third).  See id. at 692-97 (discussing the Reporters’ “duty skepticism,” and 
their effort to avoid including the concept of duty in the Restatement (Third)). 
27 This scenario is discussed by Goldberg and Zipursky.  Id. at 709-10 (discussing 
the court’s analysis of such a case in Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 
1995)). 
28 Generally, no duty exists to act affirmatively to save someone else.  See, e.g., Long 
v. Patterson, 22 So. 2d 490, 492 (Miss. 1945) (finding no duty to warn others of dan-
gerous traffic); Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (holding that a land-
lord had no duty to take a gun from a suicidal tenant); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 
346 (Pa. 1959) (finding no duty to save a neighbor from drowning). 
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In both cases, the law would say no.  Drunk’s driving was clearly 
negligent, but she owes a duty only to the class of victims put at risk by 
her negligent activity—pedestrians, not people stopping to tow her 
car or suffering heart attacks on the sidewalk.  Neither Tow Truck 
Driver nor Victim is in the zone of foreseeable parties to whom Drunk 
owes a duty of care. 
When framed in this manner, it is apparent that the function of 
duty in tort claims is relational.  It is not enough to focus solely on 
whether the actor exercised reasonable care or whether the resulting 
harm was proximately caused by the activity.  A duty must also be 
owed by the party to the victim.  A duty is owed to another person or a 
class of persons, not to the world at large. 
Nowhere has this doctrine been made clearer than in the opinion 
of Justice Cardozo in the classic case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail-
road.29  Mrs. Palsgraf sued the railroad for injuries suffered when a rail-
road conductor negligently pushed a passenger leaping onto the 
train, causing the passenger’s package to fall on the tracks.  The pack-
age exploded, dislodging scales that fell on Mrs. Palsgraf, who was 
standing some distance away on the platform.  In denying her claim, 
Cardozo famously noted: 
The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation to the 
holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, 
standing far away.  Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.  Nothing 
in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency 
of peril to persons thus removed.  Negligence is not actionable unless it 
involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a 
right.  Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.
30
From this perspective, the duty of care requirement ensures that a 
defendant’s action cannot be negligent in and of itself.31  Rather, the 
act is negligent only with respect to specific parties and specific harms.  
When assisting a passenger on the train, the conductor owed a duty of 
care to that passenger, not to the class of parties (including Mrs. 
Palsgraf) standing some distance away on the platform, apparently 
well out of harm’s way.  She and the other waiting passengers were not 
within the zone of foreseeable risk from the conductor’s conduct. 
29 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
30 Id. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31 “If an instance of unreasonable or faulty conduct is to constitute a ‘breach,’ 
then it must be a breach of some duty.  Thus, in the absence of a concept of duty, 
there is no basis for describing unreasonable conduct as ‘breach’ . . . .”  Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra note 22, at 684. 
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Whether or not a duty of care exists or should exist between the 
actor and a distant injured party is never an easy question.32  What is 
the duty of care owed by gun manufacturers to victims of crime?33  
What is the duty of cigarette manufacturers to those harmed by sec-
ond-hand smoke?34  Or, closer to the subject of this Symposium, what 
is the duty of care owed by oil companies to beach communities 
threatened by increased coastal erosion?  Climate change is essentially 
a global environmental tort.  If the courts look at the duty as rela-
tional, will they be willing to recognize a relationship between the de-
fendants and virtually everyone else in the world (because everyone is 
placed at risk by the activities of the defendants)?  In reviewing which 
plaintiffs are within the zone of foreseeable risk and thus owed a duty, 
the courts may return to a Palsgrafian analysis or to other concepts of 
duty to define the extent of tort liability.35
Assuming the courts find that the defendant does indeed owe a 
duty to the particular plaintiffs, there remains the equally difficult and 
related question of what the duty of care should entail.  For negli-
gence actions, the general level of the duty of care is well known—to 
act reasonably or not to act in such a way that creates an unreasonable 
risk of harm.36  Typically, as when Drunk drives into Bystander, we 
find that Drunk has violated her duty by acting unreasonably toward 
Bystander (i.e., driving drunk on the sidewalk).  But how would we 
characterize the reasonableness of the behavior of energy utilities 
whose emissions contribute to an increase in temperature that re-
32 “‘Duty’ is simply ‘an expression of the sum total of those considerations of pol-
icy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’”  
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 722 (Or. 1979) (quoting Mezyk v. Nat’l Re-
possessions, Inc., 405 P.2d 840, 842 (Or. 1965)). 
33 Compare Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (con-
cluding that manufacturers had a duty to victims “to market and distribute handguns 
responsibly”), rev’d sub nom. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 
2001), with Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) (hold-
ing that no such duty was owed). 
34 Cf. Renee Vintzel Loridas, Annotation, Secondary Smoke as Battery, 46 A.L.R. 5th 
813 (1997) (discussing secondary smoke as a basis for a cause of action for battery); 
Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Employer’s Liability to Employee for Failure To Provide Work 
Environment Free from Tobacco Smoke, 63 A.L.R. 4th 1021 (1988) (discussing employer 
liability for second-hand smoke in the workplace). 
35 See infra Part III.D. 
36 “[I]n negligence cases, the duty is always the same—to conform to the legal 
standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.  What the defendant 
must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy 
the duty.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 356. 
  
2007] THE DUTY OF CARE IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 1749 
 
duces snowpack, or of a car company whose products do the same 
thing? 
The duty of care analysis will be similar, although not identical, 
for tort actions based on theories other than negligence.  For cases 
based on products liability, for example, the duty is to avoid selling a 
defective product or one that is unaccompanied by an adequate warn-
ing.37  For nuisance, the obligation is not to interfere unreasonably or 
knowingly with the use and enjoyment of another’s property, and for 
public nuisance it is not to contribute unreasonably or knowingly to 
an interference with the public’s resources.38  In each case, the deter-
mination of a breach of duty can be analyzed in terms of the reason-
ableness of the defendant’s conduct (or of its product design), which 
in turn can be analyzed through a risk-utility (i.e., cost-benefit) analy-
sis of the underlying conduct (or product) and the foreseeable result-
ing harms.39  Also relevant to each of the tort actions is the availability 
of alternative approaches, technologies, or products that could reduce 
the foreseeable risk. 
II.  CLIMATE-BASED TORT CASES 
This Part introduces climate change litigation generally and 
summarizes the tort-based climate actions brought thus far.  We first 
review the potential parties in a climate change lawsuit.  We then de-
scribe how each of the climate lawsuits to date has sought to satisfy the 
duty of care requirement. 
37 See infra Part IV.  For the basic parameters of products liability claims, see RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1-2 (1998). 
38 See infra Part V.  For the basic parameters of nuisance claims, see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B-D (1979). 
39 See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.4 (2005) (“The risk-utility test 
for establishing design defectiveness is unaffected by whether the underlying theory of 
recovery is negligence, strict liablity in tort, or even implied warranty, because the nec-
essary balance between a particular design feature’s safety, costs, and effect on product 
utility remains the same.”); see also Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 n.3 (Ga. 
1994) (“[T]he determination of whether a product was defective (involving the rea-
sonableness of a manufacturer’s design decisions), which is a basic inquiry for strict 
liability purposes, generally will overlap the determination of whether the manufac-
turer’s conduct was reasonable, which is a basic inquiry for negligence purposes . . . .”); 
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Or. 1974) (“[W]hether the doc-
trine of negligence . . . or strict liability is being used to impose liability, the same 
process is going on in each instance, i.e., weighing the utility of the article against the 
risk of its use.”). 
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A.  Potential Defendants in Climate Change Cases 
Three broad categories of potential defendants could be the tar-
get of climate tort actions.  The first includes those oil, gas, and coal 
companies and other producers of fossil fuels whose combustion directly 
increases greenhouse gas emissions.  One study estimates that one oil 
company, ExxonMobil (and its corporate predecessors), has contrib-
uted approximately “five per cent of global, man-made, climate chang-
ing carbon dioxide emissions over the last 120 years.”40  The second 
category includes direct users of fossil fuels that cause greenhouse gas 
emissions.41  This is potentially an enormous category, of course, and 
includes every citizen who drives a car or Boy Scout troop that sings 
around a campfire.  On the other hand, a relatively small number of 
utilities contribute a substantial portion of total U.S. emissions.  Ac-
cording to the complaint in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, the 
five largest fossil fuel burning utilities are not only the five largest 
emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States but account for ap-
proximately 10% of all anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in the 
country.42  The last category includes those companies that manufacture 
or market products whose use contributes to climate change.  The paradig-
matic defendants in this category are automobile companies. 
Suits against each of these parties raise interesting duty issues.  Car 
makers, oil companies, utilities, and others all have a duty to behave 
reasonably and avoid the unreasonable imposition of harm on others, 
of course, but what is the nature of this duty?  With respect to car 
companies, for example, is it unreasonable to produce cars that fully 
comply with existing regulatory requirements?  Have the impacts of 
auto emissions on the climate been so foreseeable in the past that a 
reasonable car company should have accounted for them in its de-
sign?  Or is it sufficient that car companies have been conforming to 
general industry norms and customs?  Indeed, given the consistently 
40 Press Release, Friends of the Earth, ExxonMobil’s Contribution to Global 
Warming Revealed (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/ 
press_releases/exxonmobils_contribution_t_28012004.html. 
41 A further category might include the government, for taking inadequate action 
to address climate change.  See, e.g., Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859(NRB), 2005 WL 
2414744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005); see also infra note 52 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Korsinsky).  Such an approach is also the basis for a petition filed by the Inuit 
against the U.S. government to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  
Inuit Petition, supra note 14. 
42 Complaint at 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (No. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP)) [hereinafter Connecticut Complaint]. 
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strong consumer demand for SUVs and cars with powerful engines, 
could a car company even have stayed in business if it produced only 
cars with low greenhouse gas emissions?  Looking to the future, when 
will foreseeability and design options have progressed enough that the 
duty of car companies should evolve?  Does the consistent lobbying of 
some automobile companies against national fuel emissions standards, 
or their opposition to California’s emissions standards in court, have 
relevance to their potential liability?  Similar questions could be posed 
of fossil fuel producers, utilities, and other potential defendants. 
B.  Potential Plaintiffs in Climate Change Litigation 
The potential plaintiffs could also be divided into several catego-
ries.  As the science of climate change develops, an increasing number 
of potential plaintiffs may be able to show harm from climate change 
impacts.  Some of these may be property owners, such as farmers who 
are experiencing reduced access to water because of smaller snow-
packs or coastal homeowners whose houses have been damaged by in-
creased storm activity.43  These property-owning plaintiffs may be able 
to base their claims in nuisance law.  Others may only be users of re-
sources—for example commercial fisherman, ski operators, or others 
with no direct property interest in the impacted resource they use—
who nonetheless may suffer direct harm to their economic well-being.  
Still others’ economic interests may be harmed because of disruptive 
reverberations in the economy.  Finally, as we have already seen, state 
attorneys general may bring public nuisance claims on behalf of their 
citizens when a state’s natural resources are harmed or the public 
health or well-being is affected.44  We may also see health-based cases 
at some point if, for example, an extreme heat wave were to cause sig-
nificant deaths or added health care costs in a state.45  Tort law might 
treat each of these plaintiffs differently.  It might allow only those with 
43 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68 (discussing a 
suit brought on behalf of 77 million people for the “public nuisance” of global warm-
ing). 
44 David Grossman provides an excellent and detailed examination of potential 
climate change defendants and plaintiffs.  Grossman, supra note 23, at 9-33. 
45 See, e.g., Christine Dell’Amore, CDC:  Climate Change a Health Threat, 
SCIENCEDAILY, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/index.php?feed= 
Science&article=UPI-1-20061204-20520400-bc-ecowellness-climaterisk.xml (quoting Dr. 
Howard Frumkin, Director of the CDC’s National Center for Environmental Health, as 
remarking that “[c]limate change is perhaps the largest looming public health chal-
lenge we face, certainly in the environmental health field”). 
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a property interest or only state attorneys general in states with par-
ticularized injuries to bring public nuisance claims, or, in the case of 
those suffering only indirect economic losses, it might allow no claim 
at all. 
Depending on the mix of plaintiffs and defendants from the 
groups listed above, we might expect to see four plausible theories of 
liability in climate-related claims:  negligence, products liability, nui-
sance, and public nuisance.  This Article will review the duty and 
breach of duty in the context of each of these theories in Part III.  Be-
fore assessing the potential of future claims, however, we first briefly 
review the tort-based climate cases that have already been filed. 
C.  Climate-Based Tort Cases Filed Thus Far 
1.  Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power, eight states and the City of 
New York filed suit against five large fossil fuel burning utilities (alleg-
edly the five largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the United States) 
and the Tennessee Valley Authority.46  The complaint alleged that 
these utilities together emit 650 million tons of carbon dioxide, which 
is “approximately ten percent of all anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
emissions in the United States.”47  The action was filed under federal 
common law and state law, charging public nuisance.  The bulk of the 
complaint focused on climate change and the alleged harms from the 
defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions both in the past and the fu-
ture.48  The only obvious references to the utilities’ duty of care ap-
pear at the end of the complaint: 
Defendants, by their emissions of carbon dioxide from the combustion 
of fossil fuels at electric generating facilities, are knowingly, intentionally 
or negligently creating, maintaining or contributing to a public nui-
sance—global warming—injurious to the plaintiffs and their citizens and 
residents. 
46 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (naming the parties in 
the case).  A related complaint was brought by three private land trusts against the 
same defendants.  Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 
(No. 04 Civ.5670(LAP)). 
47 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 42, at 26. 
48 The claimed damages included, for example, decline of average annual snowfall 
in New England from 1953-1994, and increased loss of life from prolonged heat waves 
in the future.  For a list of harms and potential harms, see id. at 28-42. 
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 Defendants’ emissions of carbon dioxide, by contributing to global 
warming, constitute a substantial and unreasonable interference with 
public rights in the plaintiffs’ jurisdictions, including, inter alia, the right 
to public comfort and safety, the right to protection of vital natural re-
sources and public property, and the right to use, enjoy, and preserve 
the aesthetic and ecological values of the natural world. 
 . . . . 
 Defendants could generate the same amount of electricity while emit-
ting significantly less carbon dioxide by employing readily available 
processes and technologies. 
 Defendants know or should know that their emissions of carbon diox-
ide contribute to global warming and to the resulting injuries and 
threatened injuries to the plaintiffs, their citizens and residents, and 
their environment.
49
The complaint made similar allegations under the law of each 
state where the utilities’ plants are located, changing the wording to 
reflect the definition of public nuisance in each state.50  The district 
court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power never reached the duty of 
care issue; it dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable political 
question.51  The case has been appealed and is pending in the Second 
Circuit. 
2.  Korsinsky v. United States EPA 
In Korsinsky v. United States EPA, the plaintiff, appearing pro se, 
sued the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the New 
York State Department of Environmental Protection and the New 
York City Department of Environmental Protection based on a public 
nuisance theory.52  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants contrib-
uted to climate change both by emitting carbon dioxide and by failing 
to implement measures that would reduce carbon dioxide.  According 
to the court, much of the plaintiff’s complaint was taken verbatim 
from the complaint in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, described 
49 Id. at 43-44. 
50 Id. at 45-49.  Thus, for example, the complaint states that, for plants located in 
Texas, the defendant utilities “have engaged and continue to engage in intentional 
and/or negligent conduct that unreasonably interferes with rights common to the 
general public and are therefore liable under the common law of public nuisance of 
the State of Texas.” Id. at 48. 
51 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
52 Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859(NRB), 2005 WL 2414744, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
29, 2005). 
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above. The plaintiff sought an injunction preventing the defendants 
from continuing to pollute and requiring them to use the plaintiff’s 
own invention to reduce GHG emissions.  The case was dismissed for 
lack of standing because of a failure to allege a specific injury.  The 
plaintiff had alleged that he was more sensitive to pollution than the 
general public and that he had developed a fear of pollution.  The 
court argued that the injuries were either conjectural, in the case of 
the sensitivity to pollution, or not related to the remedies the plaintiff 
sought, in the case of the fear of pollution.53
3.  Comer v. Murphy Oil 
Comer v. Murphy Oil was filed in April 2006.54  Ned Comer and thir-
teen other individuals harmed by Hurricane Katrina brought an ac-
tion against nine oil companies, thirty-one coal companies, and four 
chemical companies.  The plaintiffs proposed a range of causes of ac-
tion, including nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment, civil con-
spiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, and trespass.  
The claim for public and private nuisance alleged: 
 Defendants have willfully, wrongfully, unreasonably, unwarrantably 
and unlawfully used their property and conducted their business to 
mine, drill, manufacture, release, vent, and/or combust substances in 
such a way as to produce massive amounts of greenhouse gasses. 
 The Defendants’ behavior and greenhouse gas emissions result in 
material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, injury, and/or hurt to 
the public and the Plaintiffs in particular . . . .
55
The claims for negligence addressed the duty issue directly, alleg-
ing that: 
 The Defendants had and continue to have a duty to conduct their 
business in such a way as to avoid unreasonably endangering the envi-
ronment, public health, and public and private property, as well as the 
citizens of the State of Mississippi. 
 The Defendants breached their duties by emitting substantial quanti-
ties of greenhouse gases, knowing that such emissions would unreasona-
53 Id. at *2. 
54 See Third Amended Complaint, Comer v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A., No. 1:05-CV-
00436-LTS-RHW (S.D. Miss. Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Comer Complaint]; see also 
Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05 CV 436 LTD RHW, 2006 WL 1066645, at 
*3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006) (dismissing without prejudice the claims against insur-
ance companies and mortgage providers, but preserving the claims against the oil and 
chemical company defendants). 
55 Comer Complaint, supra note 54, at 16. 
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bly endanger the environment, public health, and public and private 
property interests. 
56
The Comer case is currently pending a decision on the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. 
4. California v. General Motors Corp. 
California v. General Motors is the most recent climate tort action, 
filed in September 2006.57  Brought by the California Attorney Gen-
eral, the suit charges that General Motors (GM) and five other major 
motor vehicle manufacturers committed a federal common law and 
state law public nuisance.  According to the complaint, the defen-
dants’ vehicle emissions in the United States contribute approximately 
“nine percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions,” twenty per-
cent of U.S. emissions, and thirty percent of emissions from Califor-
nia.58  As the text below suggests, California alleges that, by manufac-
turing products defendants knew would contribute to climate change, 
they have breached a duty not to unreasonably interfere with public 
welfare.  In its complaint, the state makes the following claims: 
 2.  . . . Defendants have for many years produced millions of automo-
biles that collectively emit massive quantities of carbon dioxide in the 
United States and have thus contributed to an elevated level of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. . . .
59
 5.  Damages caused by global warming are cognizable, ongoing, and 
increasing.  Defendants are aware of the impacts and have chosen to 
continue to produce products that generate enormous quantities of car-
bon dioxide, to the detriment of California.
60
 59.  Defendants’ emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases, by contributing to global warming, constitutes a substantial and 
unreasonable interference with public rights in California’s jurisdiction, 
including, among other things, public comfort and safety, natural re-
sources and public property, and aesthetic and ecological values.
61
 61.  Defendants know or should have known, and know or should 
know, that their emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases contribute to global warming and to the resulting injuries and 
56 Id. at 18. 
57 California Complaint, supra note 21. 
58 Id. at 2, 9. 
59 Id. at 2. 
60 Id. at 3. 
61 Id. at 12. 
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threatened injuries to California, its citizens and residents, environment, 
and economy.
62
California primarily seeks monetary damages for expenses and dam-
ages incurred in connection with global warming.  The case is cur-
rently pending a decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
III.  DUTY OF CARE IN CLIMATE ACTIONS  
BASED ON NEGLIGENCE 
As cases evolve from simple car accidents to more complicated 
negligence actions, how do courts go about determining whether the 
duty of care has been breached?  For our purposes, we will examine 
four broad approaches: (1) the social utility analysis reflected in 
Learned Hand’s BPL formula, (2) multifactor balancing tests, which 
reflect additional factors beyond BPL, (3) industry custom, and (4) 
overriding policy concerns.  Each of these is analyzed below in the 
context of climate change litigation. 
A.  Risk-Utility Analysis (BPL) 
One frequently used method for analyzing whether a defendant 
has acted negligently is to compare the costs of avoiding the negligent 
behavior with the likely damages caused by the activity.  Judge 
Learned Hand’s famous BPL formula, sometimes known as the “Cal-
culus of Negligence,” provides the classic example of this approach in 
determining whether or not to impose a duty.  In United States v. Car-
roll Towing Co., Hand proposed that tort liability for negligence should 
be imposed when the burden of preventing injury is less than the 
product of the magnitude of the injury and its likelihood (B < P × L).63  
The main insight of this heuristic is that the duty to prevent harm is 
dependent on comparing the costs of avoiding damage or preventing 
harm with the expected damages from the activity.  As stated by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
 [w]here an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as in-
volving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is 
negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law re-
62 Id. at 13. 
63 159 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s duty, as in other similar situa-
tions, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables:  (1) The 
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; 
(3) the burden of adequate precautions.”). 
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gards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is 
done.
64
In determining the reasonableness of a certain action, a defen-
dant cannot emphasize only the costs she personally faces, but must 
also consider the external social costs of her activity.  Where the costs 
of avoiding large amounts of potential damages would be reasonable, 
a defendant has a duty to incur those costs.  Where such costs would 
be unreasonable in light of the potential risk, the defendant is under 
no such duty.  Under this view, a principle purpose of tort law is to 
maximize social utility, because where the costs of accidents exceed 
the costs of preventing them, the law will impose liability.65
In the climate change context, scientific developments over the 
past decade have shifted, and continue to shift, each element of the 
BPL formula in the direction of liability.  The identifiable risks of cli-
mate change are becoming better understood, and most of them have 
become more likely with greater consequences than was thought even 
a decade ago.  In addition, new technologies are lowering the costs of 
pollution control equipment, carbon storage, fuel switching, and re-
newable and other energy alternatives. 
Consider, for example, the changing views expressed by the 
Economist magazine over the past decade.  In 1995, the Economist ar-
gued that the uncertainty over both the costs and benefits of global 
warming (because some areas of the world might benefit from a 
warmer climate), combined with the effect of discounting future costs, 
counseled against taking significant action to respond to climate 
change.  The pessimistic prediction that global warming would reduce 
the world’s income by 20% a century hence, it was argued, simply 
meant that “the world economy expands a little more slowly than oth-
erwise,” since “the world economy could, if recent growth continues, 
be over 300% bigger in 2095 than today’s—and, therefore, that much 
better able to bear the costs of coping with climate change.”66  Asking 
the hard questions, such as why people should sacrifice today for a 
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). 
65 See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981) (noting 
that denying liability for the Kepone pollution of the Chesapeake Bay would not serve 
the goal of social utility); Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 75 
(D. Minn. 1963) (“The standard of conduct which is the basis of the law of negligence 
is determined by balancing the risk and the probability and extent of the harm against 
the expediency of the course of conduct pursued.”); Md. Cas. Co. v. City of Jackson,  
493 So. 2d 955, 960 n.3 (Miss. 1986) (discussing, but not applying, Hand’s analysis). 
66 Stay Cool, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 1995, at 11. 
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problem whose extent and cost remain uncertain, the Economist ar-
gued that 
[t]here are more pressing environmental concerns such as urban smog, 
the spread of disease and inadequate sanitation in poor countries.  
Unlike global warming, these cause enormous suffering for millions of 
people now.  And it would cost less to alleviate or even eliminate them 
than to reduce sharply the world’s output of greenhouse gases.
67
But, eleven years later, in a special survey devoted to climate 
change, the Economist concluded just the opposite: 
 Since . . . five years ago, the science has tended to confirm the idea 
that something serious is happening.  In the 1990s, satellite data seemed 
to contradict the terrestrial data that showed temperatures rising.  The 
disparity puzzled scientists and fuelled scepticism.  The satellite data, it 
turned out, were wrong:  having been put right, they now agree with ter-
restrial data that things are hotting [sic] up.  Observations about what is 
happening to the climate have tended to confirm, or run ahead of, what 
the models predicted would happen. . . . 
 This survey will argue that although the science remains uncertain, 
the chances of serious consequences are high enough to make it worth 
spending the (not exorbitant) sums needed to try to mitigate climate 
change.68
If the Economist were a jury, it would have just flipped its position 
on climate liability after eleven years.  This switch becomes more un-
derstandable by looking at each of the elements in Hand’s BPL for-
mula. 
1.  The Likelihood (P) and Severity of the Damage (L) 
As suggested by the Economist, an emerging scientific consensus 
now broadly accepts that climate change is happening, is caused by 
human activities, and is resulting in specific injuries or will do so in 
the foreseeable future.  For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the international body charged with periodi-
cally reviewing and reporting on the state of climate change science, 
concluded as early as 2001 that “most of the observed warming over 
the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in green-
house gas concentrations.” 69  “Likely” is defined by the IPCC to mean 
67 Id. 
68 The Heat is On, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 3, 6. 
69 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 10 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) 
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there is a confidence level of between 66%-90%.70  In its most recent 
2007 report, the IPCC’s level of certainty increased to “very likely” 
(i.e., greater than 90%) that human-caused increases in greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) were the cause of observed global warming.71
According to the IPCC, it is also “unequivocal” that the planet is 
now warming.72  Long-term climate data suggest that the planet’s aver-
age surface air temperature has increased significantly since the late 
nineteenth century.  Moreover, average global temperatures are now 
expected to be much higher much sooner than was predicted even a 
decade ago.  A 2006 National Academy of Sciences report confirmed 
that the last few decades of the twentieth century were the warmest in 
the past 400 years and likely over the past 1100 years.73  Eleven of the 
past twelve years are the warmest years on record.74  In all, the planet 
has warmed by an estimated 0.76°C (1.3°F) since the mid-1800s, with 
warming likely over every continent except Antarctica.75  According to 
the IPCC, global average temperatures are estimated to rise an addi-
tional 1.1°C to 6.4°C by the year 2100, depending on the underlying as-
sumptions about future climate policies and the magnitude of feedback 
loops.76  Such a rate of warming is very likely to have been without 
precedent for at least the last 10,000 years.77
So what if the planet’s temperature increases?  The key issue is 
whether that temperature increase has an impact on human health 
and the environment.  In 2001, the IPCC concluded that climate 
change was already having a discernible impact on many different en-
vironmental systems: 
[hereinafter IPCC, 2001 SCIENTIFIC BASIS]. 
70 Id. at 2 n.7. 
71 IPCC, WORKING GROUP I,  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 
10 (2007), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_SPM.pdf 
[hereinafter IPCC, 2007 PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS]. 
72 Id. at 5. 
73 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADEMIES, SURFACE TEMPERATURE RECON-
STRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST 2,000 YEARS 3 (2006). 
74
 IPCC, 2007 PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 71, at 5. 
75 Id. at 5, 11; see also James Hansen et al., Earth’s Energy Imbalance:  Confirmation 
and Implications, 308 SCIENCE 1431, 1432 (2005) (estimating a 0.6°C to 0.7°C increase 
in global temperature since 1880); J. Hansen et al., NASA, Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies, GISS Surface Temperature Analysis:  Global Temperature Trends:  2005 
Summation (Dec. 15, 2005), http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/2005 (plotting the 
warming trend in the global mean surface temperature since 1880). 
76
 IPCC, 2007 PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 71, at 13 tbl.SPM-3. 
77 Id. at 5. 
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 Available observational evidence indicates that regional changes in 
climate, particularly increases in temperature, have already affected a 
diverse set of physical and biological systems in many parts of the world.  
Examples of observed changes include shrinkage of glaciers, thawing of 
permafrost, later freezing and earlier break-up of ice on rivers and lakes, 
lengthening of mid- to high-latitude growing seasons, poleward and 
altitudinal shifts of plant and animal ranges, declines of some plant and 
animal populations, and earlier flowering of trees, emergence of insects, 
and egg-laying in birds . . . . 
 . . . In most cases where changes in biological and physical systems 
were detected, the direction of change was that expected on the basis of 
known mechanisms.  The probability that the observed changes in the 
expected direction (with no reference to magnitude) could occur by 
chance alone is negligible.
78
In the six years between the third and fourth IPCC reports, sub-
stantial additional evidence has confirmed a variety of negative im-
pacts from climate change that are both widespread and profound.79  
As of 2001, satellite data show an estimated 10% loss in the extent of 
global snow cover since the 1960s, and ground observations suggest a 
reduction of about two weeks in the annual duration of lake and river 
ice cover in the middle and high latitudes of the northern hemisphere 
during the last century.80  In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assess-
ment (ACIA) found that the Arctic was warming much more rapidly 
than anticipated—at nearly twice the rate of the rest of the planet.81  
In Alaska and Western Canada, average winter temperatures have risen 
by as much as 4°F to 7°F (3°C to 4°C) over the past 50 years.82  The 
ACIA reported that, by 2100, half of the Arctic’s summer sea ice and a 
significant portion of the Greenland Ice Sheet will have melted.83  
These estimates may have been too benign, as two years later the Arc-
tic winter sea ice reached an all-time low in March 2006, with ap-
proximately 300,000 km2 less than in the previous year, perhaps re-
78 Compare IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTA-
TION, AND VULNERABILITY 2 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/spm13apr07.pdf, with 
IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VUL-
NERABILITY 3 (James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001). 
79 For a summary of potential impacts from climate change, see DAVID HUNTER, 
JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 
639-45 (3rd ed. 2006). 
80 IPCC, 2001 SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 69, at 30. 
81 SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT:  IMPACTS OF A WARM-
ING ARCTIC 8 (2004). 
82 Id. at 12. 
83 Id. at 30, 33. 
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flecting the record high global temperatures of 2005.84  At the current 
rate, some scientists now predict that the Arctic Ocean could be ice 
free as early as 2030.85
The Antarctic appears to be in similar condition.  The Antarctic 
ice sheets are melting at a rate of approximately 150 km3 per year 
(plus or minus 80km3), which is roughly the total U.S. water consump-
tion over three months and is projected to result in a 0.4 mm rise in 
sea level each year.86
In addition to sea level rise from reduction in polar ice caps, other 
significant impacts from climate change include reduced snowpack 
and resulting water scarcity, regional changes in the type and extent 
of forest cover, increased desertification, biodiversity loss, loss of per-
mafrost, ocean acidification, and increased frequency and intensity of 
storm events, among others.87  The 2007 IPCC report concludes that 
various impacts, including heat waves, droughts, heavy rainfalls, tropi-
cal storms, and storm surges range from “more likely than not” to 
“likely” to be attributable to human-induced climate change, with the 
probabilities for all such events increasing over the next century.88
What then are the global costs of climate change—the L in the 
BPL formula?  Various estimates exist and provide vastly different 
numbers.  Most analysts put the costs at somewhere between 0% and 
3% of global GDP.  Nordhaus, in a widely cited analysis, has estimated 
the global costs at approximately 2.4% of global GDP or approxi-
mately $30 per ton of carbon.89  More recently, a study commissioned 
by the U.K. government—known as the Stern Review and released in 
October 2006—based its estimates on more recent higher estimates of 
global temperature increases.  The Stern Review places the costs of cli-
mate change under business-as-usual scenarios at 5% of global GDP,  
with more pessimistic assumptions putting the loss at 20% of GDP by 
84 Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., Winter Sea Ice Fails To Recover, Down to Record Low, NDIC 
NEWS, Apr. 5, 2006, http://nsidc.org/news/press/20060404_winterrecovery.html. 
85 David Adam, Meltdown Fear as Arctic Ice Cover Falls to Record Winter Low, 
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, May 15, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/story/ 
0,,1774815,00.html?gusrc=rss. 
86 Envtl. & Energy Study Inst., Climate Change News—March 3, 2006, http:// 
www.eesi.org/publications/Newsletters/CCNews/3.3.06%20CCNews.htm. 
87 For a comprehensive table setting out the current and potential impacts of cli-
mate change, see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 79, at 641-43. 
88
 IPCC, 2007 PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 71, at 8, 9 tbl.SPM-2. 
89 WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD:  ECONOMIC 
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2000). 
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the end of the century.90  Assuming a global GDP of roughly $20 tril-
lion, the estimated annual impacts range from $500 billion to $4 tril-
lion.91
Those who follow the climate change debate have become accus-
tomed to long lists of potential impacts (and in fact may have become 
rather inured to them), but tort litigation forces the courts, defen-
dants, and others to focus on these impacts more closely, particularly 
as they relate to specific plaintiffs or categories of plaintiffs.92  The 
IPCC’s willingness to state that increases in temperature are more 
than 90% likely to be caused by human activities and that such in-
creases are already having discernible impacts not only supports cau-
sation in a tort case, but also responds generally to the BPL formula.  
The likelihood is high and the potential impacts are severe.  The 
IPCC’s practice of bounding its statements with probabilities is also 
helpful to litigants in climate change cases. 
Although the IPCC’s periodic reviews of the climate change sci-
ence and the economic estimates of total costs are important, the 
growing research on particularized impacts in specific geographic re-
gions is just as important for specific tort cases.  Thus, for example, 
both the Connecticut and California complaints necessarily emphasize 
impacts specific to their states or regions. 
The complaint in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, for exam-
ple, highlights regional impacts, such as reduced snowpack and ice; 
increased loss of life and public health threats from heat-related ill-
nesses and smog; impacts on the San Francisco Bay, Jamaica Bay Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge, and other coastal resources from storm surges 
90 See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE STERN RE-
VIEW, at xv (2007).  A prepublication version of the Stern Review is available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_ 
change/stern_review_report.cfm. 
91 These macro-estimates of future impacts from climate change are controversial 
and could either under- or overestimate actual costs significantly.  For example, most 
of these estimates fail to consider impacts of climate change on animals.  See Wayne 
Hsiung & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1739-
40 (2007) (noting the failure of most analysts to include loss of animals in costs of cli-
mate change and placing the worldwide value of such loss at between $1.1 and $2.8 
trillion annually); see also Kate Galbraith, The Trillion-Dollar Question, GRIST, Nov. 16, 
2005, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/11/16/galbraith (describing differ-
ent estimates for the cost of climate change). 
92 See, e.g., David Hunter, The Implications of Climate Change Advocacy for International 
Environmental Law-Making, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  SUB-NATIONAL, NA-
TIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky 
eds., forthcoming 2007). 
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and permanent sea level rise;93 lower water levels in the Great Lakes;94 
increased temperatures in the upper surfaces of the Great Lakes;95 
and rapid declines in forest resources, including New York’s Adiron-
dack State Park.96
Similarly, the complaint in California v. General Motors described 
the following harms from climate change: 
 Right now, global warming is harming California, its environment, its 
economy, and the health and well-being of its citizens. . . . Human-
induced global warming has, among other things, reduced California’s 
snow pack (a vital source of fresh water), caused an earlier melting of 
the snow pack, raised sea levels along California’s coastline, increased 
ozone pollution in urban areas, increased the threat of wildfires, and 
cost the State millions of dollars in assessing those impacts and prepar-
ing for the inevitable increase in those impacts and for additional im-
pacts.97
The California complaint subsequently details the impacts of 
global warming and specifies costs California is already incurring to 
respond to global warming.  These impacts include, for example, a 
decline in snowpack in the Sierra Nevadas due to an increase in aver-
age winter temperatures; the costs of rebuilding levees to prevent sea 
water infiltration and other impacts of sea level rise from affecting the 
Sacramento Bay-Delta; increased floods from earlier spring runoffs; 
and beach preservation efforts to reverse increased beach erosion 
from sea level rise.98
As these complaints indicate, unlike even a decade ago, strong 
evidence today links climate change to specific anticipated impacts at 
the local or state level.  This understanding supports moving the de-
bate over climate policy from general policy debates to case-specific 
adjudications over identifiable harms.  As these types of regional im-
pacts become better known and studied and buttressed by the 
stronger consensus findings expected to be reflected in the Fourth 
IPCC Assessment, the causal link between human activities, increased 
temperatures, changing climate, and specific impacts to identifiable 
litigants will be more clearly demonstrated.  Put another way, the 
probability (and thus foreseeability) of specific damage caused by cli-
93 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 42, at 30-33. 
94 Id. at 34-36. 
95 Id. at 36-37. 
96 Id. at 38. 
97 California Complaint, supra note 21, at 1-2. 
98 Id. at 10-12. 
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mate change is increasingly being documented.  This will not only al-
low for stronger arguments on causation but will also satisfy two 
prongs of the BPL formula—the probability of harm (P) and the se-
verity of the harm (L)—and, thus, will strengthen plaintiffs’ cases for a 
breach of the duty of reasonable care. 
2.  Burden or Cost of Avoiding Harm (B) 
At the same time the probability of serious injury from climate 
change is increasing, the costs of reducing carbon emissions are also 
decreasing.  Over time, the efficiency of the economy is increasing, as 
measured by the carbon intensity or amounts of carbon emitted per 
dollar of GDP produced.  From 1990 to 2002, for example, carbon in-
tensity was reduced 17% in the United States and 15% on average 
among the twenty-five countries with the highest emissions levels.99  
Carbon intensity is dependent on fuel mix and energy-use efficiency.  
Particularly in the absence of regulatory mandates, declines in carbon 
intensity suggest that either through fuel switching, new methodolo-
gies, new technologies, or similar changes, the economy is becoming 
increasingly carbon efficient. 
Related trends can be seen throughout the energy sector.  The 
costs of alternative energy sources, such as wind and solar power, are 
dropping steadily and are becoming increasingly competitive.  Costs 
of wind power have declined substantially—more than 80% over the 
past twenty years.100  Installed costs of solar power have dropped 5% 
per year over the past decade.101  Similarly, in the automobile industry, 
new technologies, such as hybrid vehicles, have increased efficiency at 
affordable costs.  Fuel switching is also available to the transport sys-
tem, with a growing percentage of road transport being run by natural 
gas (3%) or biofuels (0.5%).102
Clearly, many efficient technologies now exist and are increasingly 
cost effective. One survey of seventy-four companies from eighteen 
sectors in eleven countries, for example, found GHG emission reduc-
tions of up to 60% with total gross cost savings of $11.6 billion (mostly 
99 KEVIN A. BAUMERT ET AL., NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS:  GREENHOUSE GAS DATA 
AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 25, 26 & fig.5.1 (2005). 
100 John Carey et al., Alternate Power:  A Change Is in the Wind, BUS. WK., July 4, 
2005, at 36, 37; see also AM. WIND ENERGY ASSOC., THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT WIND ENERGY 6 (2002), http://www.awea.org/pubs/documents/ 
FAQ2002%20-%20web.pdf. 
101 Carey et al., supra note 100, at 37. 
102 BAUMERT ET AL., supra note 99, at 63. 
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because of reduced energy costs).103  In fact, considerable progress on 
addressing climate change can be achieved simply through the dis-
semination and “scaling up” of technologies and practices that are al-
ready well known.  Princeton researchers Stephen Pacala and Robert 
Socolow, for example, have devised a portfolio of what they call “stabi-
lization wedges”—technological or policy innovations that would 
make significant progress toward reducing GHG emissions.104  To 
achieve an overall goal of stabilizing GHG emissions at levels “less 
than double the pre-industrial concentration,” Pacala and Socolow es-
timated that, in fifty years, the global economy will have to emit seven 
billion tons of carbon per year less than what current trends suggest is 
a “business-as-usual trajectory.”105  They divide the needed reductions 
in GHG emissions into seven equal “stabilization wedges,” each repre-
senting one billion tons of reductions per year in carbon emissions by 
2054.  They then list fifteen policy options that could yield the equiva-
lent of a “stabilization wedge” of reductions (i.e., a one-billion-ton re-
duction per year).106  Each of Pacala and Socolow’s wedges involves 
technologies already commercialized somewhere in the world.  These 
wedges include reliance on alternative energy fuels such as wind 
power and photovoltaics, nuclear power, and other carbon-free fuels; 
carbon capture and storage technologies; and increased efficiency of 
fossil fuel use. 
What, then, are the costs of addressing climate change?  Estimates 
have varied, although most put the costs of stabilizing GHG emissions 
at safe levels at up to 1% of the global economy.107  This is a staggering 
amount, except when it is compared to the estimated costs of climate 
change.  As noted above, most estimates put the costs of climate 
change at just under 3% of the global economy (three times as 
much), with more recent estimates ranging from 5% to 20%.108
103 CLIMATE GROUP, supra note 8, at 3. 
104 Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges:  Solving the Climate Prob-
lem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968 (2004); see also 
Robert H. Socolow & Stephen W. Pacalow, A Plan To Keep Carbon in Check, SCI. AM., 
Sept. 2006, at 50, 50-57 (describing fifteen stabilization wedges). 
105 Pacala & Socolow, Stabilization Wedges, supra note 104, at 968. 
106 Id. at 968-69. 
107 See Energy Info. Admin., Comparing Cost Estimates for the Kyoto Protocol 
(1998), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/cost.html (“All the studies project irre-
ducible losses to the economy that small (less than 1 percent GDP in 2010 and 
2020) . . . .”). 
108 Supra text accompanying notes 89-90. 
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For purposes of analyzing a specific climate change claim, the BPL 
formula may be less about global costs and benefits and more about 
the costs and benefits present in a specific case.  The complaints filed 
thus far have recognized this, focusing on the steps that are available 
to the specific defendants to reduce their climate impact.  Thus, for 
example, in the Connecticut v. American Electric Power complaint, the at-
torneys general allege: 
 Defendants have available to them practical, feasible and economi-
cally viable options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions without sig-
nificantly increasing the cost of electricity to their customers.  These op-
tions include changing fuels, improving efficiency, increasing generation 
from zero- or low-carbon energy sources such as wind, solar, and gasified 
coal with emissions capture, co-firing wood or other biomass in coal 
plants, employing demand-side management techniques, altering the 
dispatch order of their plants, and other measures.
109
Later, the attorneys general assert that “[d]efendants could gen-
erate the same amount of electricity while emitting significantly less 
carbon dioxide by employing readily available processes and tech-
nologies.”110
An incomplete, though instructive, back-of-the-envelope method 
to assess costs is to price the emissions reductions sought in the cli-
mate complaints.  The Connecticut complaint, for example, seeks an 
injunction to require the utility companies to cap their emissions (al-
legedly 650 million tons per year) and then to reduce them by some 
set amount each year.  If we assume reductions of 7% (arbitrarily set 
at the level of reduction to which the United States would have com-
mitted under the Kyoto Protocol111), then companies would be asked 
to reduce their emissions by 45 million tons each year.  If one uses 
current carbon market prices in Europe and the United States, this 
would cost the utilities in total from $180 to $450 million per year 
(based on the oversimplified assumption that the current range of 
carbon costs—$4 per ton in the Chicago Climate Exchange to $18 per 
ton in the European Climate Exchange—would remain un-
109 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 42, at 2. 
110 Id. at 44.  Although the Connecticut and California complaints are based on 
public nuisance theories (and not negligence), the complaints are nonetheless instruc-
tive for negligence-based analyses. 
111 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Annex B, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
convkp/kpeng.pdf.  Note that the Kyoto Protocol requires reductions from a 1990 
baseline.  We have not attempted to adjust for any increase in the utilities’ baseline 
emissions since 1990. 
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changed).112  If divided equally among the five Connecticut defen-
dants, the cost per defendant would have been $36 to $162 million. 
Similar calculations could also be made with respect to the defen-
dant automobile companies named in the California complaint.  Ac-
cording to the complaint, the defendants’ automobile emissions in 
California amount to just under 300 million tons per year.  Assuming 
that a reasonable automobile manufacturer would meet the 4% an-
nual increase in fuel efficiency recommended by the Energy Security 
Leadership Council,113 the costs would be $48 to $120 million in the 
first year (assuming again that offsets were purchased as opposed to 
reductions in emissions).114  Estimates vary on what the costs would be 
for meeting the increased efficiency standards, with some suggesting 
that the costs of efficient vehicles would be lower than the average ve-
hicle costs in 2010,115 while others price the welfare costs associated 
with increased fuel efficiency standards at $3.6 billion per year (to ob-
tain a 10% decrease in fuel consumption).116
We should make it clear that these estimates are based on several 
oversimplified assumptions (e.g., market price of carbon will not 
112 The price of carbon in the European market has fluctuated substantially, rang-
ing from 1 to 33 euros per ton.  The price for 2007 carbon credits crashed because of 
an unexpected surplus.  Emmanuel Angleys, No Cheers in Carbon Market as Kyoto Protocol 
Heads for Second Birthday, ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.energy-daily.com/ 
reports/No_Cheers_In_Carbon_Market_As_Kyoto_Protocol_Heads_For_Second_ 
Birthday_999.html.  We have used the vintage 2008 price as of February 16, 2007.  See 
European Climate Exchange, http://www.europeanclimateexchange.com (last visited 
May 1, 2007) (providing historic market data for carbon credits).  The U.S. carbon 
price is based on the Chicago Climate Exchange’s price quote for a ton of carbon.  See 
Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited May 1, 
2007). 
113 ENERGY SEC. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATION ON 
REDUCING U.S. OIL DEPENDENCE 8 (2006), available at http://www.secureenergy.org/ 
reports/ESLC_Oil_Report.pdf; see also Fuel Economy Reform Act, S. 3694, 109th Cong. 
§ 4(a)(2)(C) (2006) (enacted) (requiring fuel efficiency standards to be increased by 
4% per year between 2009 and 2011). 
114 Note that computing the total social cost for fuel-efficiency increases is com-
plex, because consumers would save money from lower fuel usage.  For example, over 
twenty years, a 4% per-year improvement in fuel efficiency would save consumers ap-
proximately $1.4 trillion at the pump by 2028.  Press Release, Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 
Senators Laud Energy Security Leadership Council Call for Increase in Fuel Economy 
Standards (Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author). 
115 Am. Council for an Energy-Efficient Econ., Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards:  
Big Energy Savings at a Modest Cost, http://www.aceee.org/energy/cafe.htm (last vis-
ited May 1, 2007). 
116 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS 
VERSUS A GASOLINE TAX 16 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index= 
4917&sequence=1&from=0. 
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change in the face of increased demand), but they do provide first-
order estimates for the costs of avoiding the negligent behavior (i.e., 
emissions beyond Kyoto-level reductions).  The point is not to develop 
a precise estimate of the compliance costs, but to show that a BPL in-
quiry is possible and that the likely costs of avoidance may in some 
cases be less than the likely damages from climate change.  Under 
Hand’s formula, a defendant’s failure to take those steps could be 
considered a breach of her duty to act reasonably under the circum-
stances. 
More importantly, trends in carbon intensity and in the declining 
cost of renewables and other green technologies mean that the cost of 
addressing climate change is declining over time.  This suggests that, 
in future cases, the burden of avoiding harm will be lower than today, 
making the imposition of liability more likely. 
B.  Multifactor Test 
Despite the attractive simplicity of the BPL calculus, in practice, 
no simple formula exists to determine the duty of care.  Rather, ac-
cording to Prosser and Keeton, courts generally balance a range of 
considerations: 
It is therefore not surprising to find that the problem of duty is as broad 
as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has 
been formulated. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead 
the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [A]s our ideas of human relations change the law as to duties 
changes with them.
117
Dissatisfied with such a vague formulation, Prosser and Keeton go 
on to list factors that courts have considered in determining the duty 
of care, including convenience of administration, capacity of parties 
to bear the loss, preventing future injuries, moral blame attached to 
the wrongdoer, and other considerations.  Courts have come up with 
additional factors, such as this list from a 1981 California case, where 
the court held that the duty turns on 
(1) foreseeability of harm to plaintiff; (2) degree of certainty that plain-
tiff suffered injury; (3) closeness of connection between defendant’s 
117 KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 357-59 (footnotes omitted). 
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conduct and injury suffered; [(4)] moral blame attached to defendant’s 
conduct; (5) policy of preventing future harm; (6) extent of burden to 
the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and (7) availabil-
ity, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
118
Several of these factors are essentially the same as those found in the 
BPL analysis above, but others require additional analysis. 
1.  Foreseeability of Harm to Plaintiff 
As suggested by the discussion above regarding the likelihood of 
severe climate impacts, the foreseeability of harm from carbon emis-
sions is becoming clearer over time.119  Most scientific studies now 
predict rising temperatures and direct impacts from them—such as 
reduced snowpack, glaciers, and polar ice caps—which are easily un-
derstood and, thus, easily considered foreseeable impacts.  The indi-
rect types of harm resulting from the interaction between rising tem-
peratures and other factors are arguably less foreseeable, but even 
these are now widely anticipated.  Examples include tropical storms, 
hurricanes, and their resulting storm surges.120
If many of these general impacts are currently foreseeable, two 
questions remain less clear.  Are any specific injuries foreseeable—for 
example the impacts of specific storm surges or hurricanes—and when 
did such foreseeability arise?  Courts will need to answer both ques-
tions in order to impose liability on defendants who are not currently 
taking steps to mitigate their climate impacts or did not begin taking 
concrete actions until well after the resulting injury was foreseeable.  
Although a jury could reasonably find that the injury from climate 
change generally has been foreseeable for a decade or more,121 as 
noted above, the ability to attribute specific weather events or other 
current impacts to climate change varies considerably depending on 
the circumstances. 
118 Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
119 See supra text accompanying note 68. 
120 The IPCC concluded that it is “more likely than not” that human-induced cli-
mate change has already contributed to such events and that more such human events 
are “likely” or “very likely” in the future.  IPCC, 2007 PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra 
note 71, at 9 tbl.SPM-2; see also Sandra Fleishman, Sea Change in Insurers’ Coastal Cover-
age, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2006, at F1 (reporting that insurers are declining to insure 
coastal homes because of “predictions that more strong hurricanes will strike the 
coast”). 
121 See infra text accompanying note 124 (providing a timeline of global warming 
predictions and observations). 
  
1770 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1741 
 
2.  Degree of Certainty That Plaintiff Suffered Harm 
This is the P in the BPL formula discussed in Part III.A.1 above.  
As was noted above, the probability of damages occurring due to cli-
mate change is being increasingly documented over time, which will 
strengthen a plaintiff’s ability to show that she was likely to be 
harmed. 
3.  Closeness of Connection Between Defendant’s  
Conduct and Injury Suffered 
Although included in the factors relating to a breach of duty, this 
factor is better considered as either one of proximate causation or just 
an additional aspect of the foreseeability of harm discussed above.  
Climate change impacts can be remote in both time and geography 
from where the emissions occur.  Moreover, any single defendant’s 
current emissions mix in the atmosphere with the emissions from the 
climate-altering activities of other parties.  A particular defendant’s 
contribution to climate change will usually be the cause of only a rela-
tively small part of the damage.122  Complicating matters even further 
is that today’s climate changes are caused by a mixture of the defen-
dant’s current emissions and past emissions.  This factor is a problem-
atic one for climate plaintiffs, although the issue is probably best ana-
lyzed in terms of proximate causation.123
4.  Moral Blame Attached to Defendant’s Conduct 
The moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct relates to 
factors such as the defendant’s knowledge, at the time of the defen-
dant’s actions, of the potential impacts of the defendant’s conduct; 
discrepancies between the defendant’s conduct and the conduct of 
similarly situated companies; and the degree to which the defendant’s 
conduct was reckless or intentionally dismissive of potential risks.  
Viewed in this light, the relative moral blame that can be attached to a 
set of defendants is likely to change over time.  Conduct and products 
122 But see Press Release, supra note 40 (calculating that ExxonMobil and its corpo-
rate ancestors have caused approximately 5% of global emissions over the past 120 
years). 
123 Prosser and Keeton are explicit about the convergence between duty analysis 
and proximate causation:  “There is little analysis of the problem of duty in the courts.  
Frequently it is dealt with in terms of what is called ‘proximate cause,’ usually with re-
sulting confusion.  In such cases, the question of what is ‘proximate’ and that of duty 
are fundamentally the same . . . .”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 358. 
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linked to significant GHG emissions in the 1970s or 1980s would likely 
be viewed differently in 2006.  The perspective on such practices and 
products changes as science clarifies the threat GHG emissions pre-
sent to the planet’s climate.  Although no precise date can be set for 
when a company’s failure to begin to respond to climate change be-
comes  “immoral” or “unreasonable,” a timeline of key dates can be 
helpful in understanding where such a date might be placed by the 
courts—or, more precisely, by juries. 
 
Figure 1:  Climate Change Law and Policy Timeline124
Year Events 
1827 Jean-Baptiste Fourier suggests the existence of an atmos-
pheric “greenhouse” effect keeping the Earth warmer than it 
would otherwise be.  
1890s Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius and American P.C. Cham-
berlain independently argue that increasing concentrations 
of atmospheric carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fu-
els could lead to global warming. 
1957 U.S. oceanographer Roger Revelle warns that people are con-
ducting a “large-scale geophysical experiment” on the planet 
by releasing GHGs.  Colleague David Keeling establishes the 
first continuous monitoring of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
levels and finds regular annual increases. 
1979 The First World Climate Conference calls on governments 
“to foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in cli-
mate.” 
1985 The first major international conference on the greenhouse 
effect at Villach, Austria, warns that GHGs will “in the first 
half of the next century, cause a rise of global mean tempera-
ture which is greater than any in man’s history” and that sea 
levels could rise by up to a meter.  
1987 The warmest year on record.  The 1980s are the warmest dec-
ade recorded to date, with seven of the eight warmest years 
recorded up to 1990. 
 
124 Figure 1 was adapted, with minor edits, from Green House Network, Climate 
Change:  Timeline, available at http://www.greenhousenet.org/resources/timeline.html 
(last visited May 1, 2007).  An entry has been added for 2005 by the authors. 
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1988 Dr. James Hansen of NASA tells a congressional hearing that 
“global warming is at hand.”  A meeting of climate scientists 
in Toronto subsequently calls for 20% cuts in global carbon 
dioxide emissions by the year 2005.  The U.N. sets up the 
IPCC to analyze and report on scientific findings. 
1990 The IPCC’s first report finds that the planet has warmed by 
0.5°C in the past century.  The IPCC warns that only strong 
measures to halt rising greenhouse gas emissions will prevent 
serious global warming.  
1992 The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed 
by 154 nations in Rio, seeks to prevent “dangerous” warming 
from greenhouse gases and sets an initial nonbinding target 
of reducing emissions from industrialized countries to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. 
1995 The IPCC’s second report concludes that current warming “is 
unlikely to be entirely natural in origin” and that “the bal-
ance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on 
global climate.” The report predicts global warming by the 
year 2100 will be between 1°C and 3.5°C. 
1999 Scientists, reconstructing the global climate for the last 1000 
years, using weather records, tree rings, coral, and ice-core 
readings, declare that the decade of the 1990s is the hottest 
in at least the last millennium. 
2002 The United States’s Climate Action Report 2002 warns of the 
substantial disruption of snow-fed water supplies, the loss of 
coastal and mountain ecosystems, and more frequent heat 
waves.  The trilateral North American Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation calls for “immediate action” to tackle 
greenhouse gases.  2002 is the second hottest year ever re-
corded. 
2005 The Kyoto Protocol enters into force, requiring most indus-
trialized countries to make cuts in their GHG emissions.  
Hurricane Katrina devastates New Orleans and two separate 
studies link global warming to the increased intensity and 
frequency of hurricanes. 
 
To argue that a defendant should be morally blamed for its con-
tribution to climate change, and thus that conduct ignoring climate 
change impacts has been unreasonable, arguably requires placing the 
defendant’s conduct in the context of what was known or suspected 
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about climate change at the time.  Perhaps a plan to expand oil de-
velopment or coal-fired utilities or to market inefficient SUVs was not 
blameworthy or “unreasonable” in 1990.  But what about 2000?  Or 
2005?  Given the emerging understanding of climate change, deter-
mining what an appropriate response should have been at any specific 
time is difficult.  It is, in fact, a subjective judgment about reasonable-
ness—one that usually is left, in the tort context, to juries.  Although a 
judge might declare allegations of defendants’ conduct before 1990 to 
be non-negligent as a matter of law, after that point the determination 
would seem to be better left to juries.  And certainly a reasonable jury 
could determine that a company (such as TXU, discussed later in this 
Article) that openly plans to increase its dependence on coal and an-
ticipates significantly expanded and unmitigated climate impacts is 
behaving unreasonably given the state of knowledge in 2007. 
Contributing to an analysis of the moral blameworthiness in many 
tort cases is the degree of the defendant’s recklessness or intention in 
undertaking the risky activity.  In the case of climate change, almost 
all of the potential corporate defendants are acting deliberately or in-
tentionally in ways they know contribute to climate change.  Most 
utilities, energy companies, and automobile manufacturers have ei-
ther made public pronouncements or taken policy steps that show 
they are aware of climate change threats and of their contribution to 
the problem.125
Moreover, at least some GHG emissions are likely an inherent 
outcome of the defendant’s activity (for example, emissions from 
automobiles or from utilities).  For a negligence theory, at least, the 
key inquiry may be what level of emissions is reasonable—or at what 
point did it become (or will it become) unreasonable to expand GHG 
emissions or other climate-changing activities without taking effective 
mitigation steps.  In this regard, the issue of moral blameworthiness 
may be made in reference to the specific defendant’s behavior as 
compared to industry custom.126  For example, is the defendant’s 
greenhouse gas intensity (i.e., the amount of emissions per unit of 
output) significantly higher than those of other similar defendants in 
the industry?  A host of other factors may also be relevant to future 
inquiries into the moral blameworthiness or unreasonableness of a 
defendant’s climate-changing activities, including the following: 
125 See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 42, at 44 (alleging that defendant utili-
ties knew or should have known of the risks posed by GHG emissions). 
126 For a discussion of the application of industry custom, see infra Part III.C. 
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• Marketing a product (for example, an automobile) that is par-
ticularly inefficient. 
• Planning a large expansion of electricity generation from coal-
fired power plants without budgeting for any mitigation steps. 
• Taking preventive measures in foreign operations (where they 
may be subject to climate-related regulations) while continuing 
to operate without such measures here.127 
• Making public statements or issuing policies that appear cli-
mate friendly but do not reflect actual operations.128 
• Reducing research and development budgets or slowing de-
ployment of more carbon-efficient technologies or products. 
• Issuing or promoting misinformation about climate change 
that the company knows or reasonably should have known is 
false.129 
• Withholding studies or information that would increase our 
understanding of climate change. 
• Destroying climate change related documents.130 
127 Oleszkiewicz & Sanders, supra note 23 at 2369 (“[A]s legal requirements be-
come a reality for defendants with operations in jurisdictions outside the United States, 
plaintffs will have additional opportunities to point to discrepancies in a defendant’s 
U.S. and foreign operations and to demonstrate that change is possible.”). 
128 Compare Advertisement, ExxonMobil, Let’s Talk About Climate Change, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A7 (acknowledging global warming and its impact on ecosys-
tems, and presenting ExxonMobile as a partner in the global efforts to develop policy 
responses), with Clifford Krauss & Jad Mouawad, Exxon Chief Cautions Against Rapid Ac-
tions To Cut Carbon Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at C3 (reporting (in the very 
same paper) ExxonMobil’s statement that it continues to oppose broad policy re-
sponses to climate change). 
129 At least until recently, ExxonMobil both refused to acknowledge global warm-
ing and provided financial support to several organizations that strongly oppose any 
response to climate change.  See ExxposeExxon, Why ExxonMobile?, http:// 
www.exxposeexxon.com/whyexxon.html (last visited May 1, 2007) (publicizing 
ExxonMobil’s poor environmental record). 
130 Consider in this regard, the advice given to potential climate defendants by 
Oleszkiewicz & Sanders: 
 Despite the uncertainties, it may not be too early to prepare for the possibil-
ity of litigation.  Next steps for potential defendants may include a preliminary 
risk assessment of their exposure to litigation and potential defenses, an 
evaluation of public statements to date regarding greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate change, an assessment of any disconnect between public or offi-
cial policies and operations, and the implementation of an internal document 
management program to review greenhouse gas and climate change related 
documents consistent with already existing document retention policies. 
Oleszkiewicz & Sanders, supra note 23 at 2372. 
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Although it may be impossible to say for certain whether a jury 
would consider the behavior mentioned above unreasonable under 
today’s circumstances, such behavior arguably becomes less reason-
able over time as our understanding of the impacts of climate change 
develops. 
5.  Policy of Preventing Future Harm 
Tort law is partly designed to deter unreasonably risky conduct.  
Tort liability not only deters the behavior of specific defendants, but 
also of similarly situated defendants.  Preventing or mitigating future 
climate change impacts has, in fact, been a key motivation for the law-
suits that have been filed thus far.  The state attorneys general and 
land trusts in Connecticut v. American Electric Power have not sought any 
compensatory damages, but only to enlist the court’s injunctive pow-
ers to help reduce future climate impacts by reducing defendants’ 
emissions.  Granting the relief sought in Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power would not only appreciably reduce future GHG emissions from 
the specific defendants, but it would also reverberate significantly 
through other industries and even in other countries.  In fact, just the 
filing of these climate-based tort cases is already having a deterrent ef-
fect, as concerns over “litigation risk” are increasingly shaping delib-
erations over corporate climate policies.131
6.  Extent of Burden to the Defendant and the Consequences  
to the Community of Imposing a Duty To Exercise  
Care with Resulting Liability for Breach 
This factor is in essence the B in the Hand formula and is dis-
cussed above.132  As noted previously, while some estimates of the costs 
of addressing climate change are high, those costs are decreasing over 
131 See, e.g., John Carey & Lorraine Woellert, Global Warming:  Here Come the Lawyers, 
BUS. WK., Oct. 30, 2006, at 34, 36 (quoting a corporate lawyer who states that that, in 
the wake of recently filed lawsuits, he now “advises corporate clients that they need to 
take ‘reasonable’ steps to pare back emissions to reduce their legal exposure”).  The 
preventative impact of climate-based litigation can be seen in the indirect effect of 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. 
Or. 2006).  Although the case was not a tort action, Owens Corning scrapped its 
planned polystyrene manufacturing facility after losing a standing challenge to an ac-
tion brought by environmental groups partly on the grounds that the facility would 
contribute substantially to climate change.  Katherine Trevison, Owens Corning Backs 
Out of Gresham Plant, OREGONIAN, May 9, 2006, at D1. 
132 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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time.  In addition, some estimates indicate that, however high the 
costs of addressing climate change might be, the costs of inaction may 
be higher. 
7.  Availability, Cost, and Prevalence of  
Insurance for the Risk Involved 
Some courts consider the availability of insurance for risks as a 
means of spreading the costs of tort liability.  Thus, for example, if a 
demolition company caused injury to a neighboring building, the 
availability of insurance would be relevant as a way of shifting the costs 
of that particular injury to the entire industry (through the premium 
rates charged by the insurance company).  The availability of insur-
ance for the plaintiffs to cover their losses may also be relevant.133
The insurance industry has long been conscious of the significant 
impact that climate change may have on its business.  For many years, 
insurance companies have taken climate change into account in de-
termining insurance coverage and premiums.  To insurance compa-
nies, at least, the future impacts of climate change are foreseeable and 
serious.  This is making some insurance for climate-related impacts 
more difficult to obtain or more expensive.  For example, many insur-
ance companies are reducing their coverage for new home buyers in 
coastal areas susceptible to hurricanes.134
C.  Industry Custom 
An alternative approach to analyzing negligence compares the de-
fendant’s activity to the industry’s customary practice.135  As the Re-
statement (Second) describes, customs and common practices, while not 
133 For further discussion of how this consideration pertains to the effects of cli-
mate change, see generally Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by Climate 
Change:  A Commentary, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875 (2007); Howard C. Kunreuther & Er-
wann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-scale Disasters, and the Emerg-
ing Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2007). 
134 See Fleishman, supra note 120 (reporting that insurers are declining to insure 
coastal homes because of “predictions that more strong hurricanes will strike the 
coast”); Reaping the Whirlwind, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 9, 10 (describing a with-
drawal by insurance providers from hurricane-prone markets); Morning Edition:  Allstate 
Pulls Back from Insuring Coastal Homes (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6607675 (indicating that 
threats from increased storm damage due to climate change have caused Allstate to 
discontinue homeowner’s insurance policies in several mid-Atlantic states). 
135 A comparison to industry custom or practice is also relevant to moral blame-
worthiness.  See supra text accompanying notes 125-130. 
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controlling, should be taken into account unless a reasonable person 
would not follow them: 
Evidence of the custom is admissible, and is relevant, as indicating a 
composite judgment as to the risks of the situation and the precautions 
required to meet them, as well as the feasibility of such precautions, the 
difficulty of any change in accepted methods, the actor’s opportunity to 
learn what is called for, and the justifiable expectation of others that he 
will do what is usual, as well as the justifiable expectation of the actor 
that others will do the same.  If the actor does what others do under like 
circumstances, there is at least a possible inference that he is conforming 
to the community standard of reasonable conduct . . . .
136
One can readily see why this doctrine might be significant for cli-
mate defendants.  All the major car companies, for example, rely on 
internal combustion engines and sell relatively inefficient sports utility 
vehicles.  Setting the duty of care at the standard of uniform industry 
practice, however, is not automatic. 
No group of individuals and no industry or trade can be permitted, by 
adopting careless and slipshod methods to save time, effort, or money, to 
set its own uncontrolled standard at the expense of the rest of the com-
munity.  If the only test is to be what has always been done, no one will 
ever have any great incentive to make any progress in the direction of 
safety.
137
Thus, compliance with custom may only be effective as a defense if the 
custom is itself reasonable. 
Moreover, industry customs and standards are not static.  They 
evolve over time as technological and scientific understandings shift.  
As an example, consider the case of crash barriers on roads in Wash-
ington.  In 1928, in Davison v. Snohomish County,138 the Washington 
Supreme Court ruled that a municipality was under “no duty to erect 
barriers sufficient to prevent automobiles traveling at a high rate of 
speed from crashing through.”139  The automobile was just coming 
into widespread use and many roads, which had been designed with 
the horse and buggy in mind, were not designed to protect against 
automobile accidents.  The court noted that barriers sufficiently 
strong to keep cars from running off of a bridge were not technically 
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b (1965). 
137 Id. at cmt. c; see also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (dismiss-
ing custom as being dispositive in determining the proper standard of care). 
138 270 P. 422 (Wash. 1928). 
139 Bartlett v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 447 P.2d 735, 737 (Wash. 1964) (describing the 
holding in Davison). 
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feasible at the time.140  Forty years later, because engineering and 
other technology had made it more feasible and cost effective to add 
guard rails, the Washington Supreme Court expressly found the lack 
of such barriers to be the basis for negligence and ruled, referencing 
the earlier case, that “ideas of the court, expressed 40 years ago . . . 
[are not] necessarily authoritative on the engineering and financial 
phases of the same problem today.”141
In the climate context, the duty expected from those who emit 
carbon may also be changing, particularly as new technologies be-
come available.  In the future, inquiries into the negligence of defen-
dants may focus on their relative climate impact when compared to 
others in the same industry.  According to Innovest’s Carbon Disclo-
sure Project, every industry sector has leaders and laggards with re-
spect to climate change.  Although not a direct indicator, Innovest’s 
CarbonBeta analysis evaluates each company’s sensitivity to future 
carbon regulation and then compares it to that of other companies 
within the same industry sector.  The results show a significant dispar-
ity within industry groups.  For example, the most exposed North 
American electrical utilities will face twenty times as much cost (meas-
ured as a percentage of operating income) as the least exposed com-
pany, under certain uniform assumptions about future regulation of 
GHGs.142  Relative exposure to carbon regulation risk suggests differ-
ences in the companies’ approach to GHGs—for example, differences 
in fuel mix, carbon efficiency, or product mix.  The analysis suggests 
that alternative approaches to reducing GHG emissions (i.e., the ap-
proaches taken by companies with the lowest exposure to future GHG 
regulation) exist within each industry group.  The factors that lead to 
differences in GHG-regulation risk may also be factors in finding that 
companies with relatively more carbon risk have acted “unreasona-
bly”—that is, have not kept up with industry standards. 
As one example, current practices and future plans of utilities vary 
greatly.143  Some, like American Electric Power (AEP), have been 
140 Davison, 270 P. at 423-24. 
141 Bartlett, 447 P.2d at 737. 
142 See INNOVEST, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT 2005, at 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.cdproject.net/reports.asp.  The comparative ratios for other industries are 
8 to 1 for the international electrical utilities, 11 to 1 for mining, and 4 to 1 for oil and 
gas.  Id. 
143 See DOUGLAS G. COGAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE:  
MAKING THE CONNECTION:  SUMMARY REPORT 26 (2006), http://www.ceres.org/pub/ 
docs/Ceres_corp_gov_and_climate_change_0306.pdf (ranking electric power produc-
ers based on their corporate governance responses to climate change). 
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lauded for their transparency with respect to GHG emissions, recent 
reductions in emissions, and clear plans for future investment in car-
bon-neutral technologies.144  Others, like TXU, at least until recently, 
refused to take significant proactive steps to even report, let alone re-
dress, carbon emissions and are making plans to emit substantial, un-
abated GHG emissions in the future.  As reported in the Washington 
Post: 
 Not every energy company is planning to curb greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the near future.  TXU Corp. is planning to spend $10 billion to 
build 11 new coal-fired power plants, which would more than double the 
company’s carbon dioxide emissions, from 55 million tons to 133 million 
tons a year.  That increase in emissions is more than the total carbon di-
oxide pollution emitted in all of Maryland or by 10 million Cadillac Esca-
lade sport-utility vehicles.
145
Because of its brazen approach to GHGs, TXU was targeted for 
aggressive environmental campaigning.146  TXU’s approach, when 
compared to the current actions of other utilities, might also have 
been found to constitute a violation of the duty not to create unrea-
sonable risks for others.  TXU’s position as a laggard in the industry 
may recently have changed, however, when a group of outside inves-
tors, as part of a $45 billion takeover of TXU, agreed with environ-
mentalists to scrap eight of the proposed power plants and to reduce 
their total GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.147
Similarly, an argument can be made that U.S. automobile compa-
nies have been slower than Japanese companies, notably Toyota, to 
introduce fuel-efficient cars based on hybrid technologies.  The fleets 
of passenger automobiles from the largest U.S. manufacturers contain 
144 See id. (giving AEP the top score for corporate governance response to climate 
change).  AEP reportedly reduced carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by 13% be-
tween 2000 and 2004.  THE CLIMATE GROUP, supra note 8, at 6. 
145 Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Energy Firms Come to Terms with Climate Change, 
WASH. POST,  Nov. 25, 2006, at A1.  Coal is significantly less efficient than natural gas, 
which emits 40% less greenhouse gases for a given amount of energy.  Major strategies 
for addressing climate change involve either switching fuels away from coal or wide-
spread adoption of carbon capture and storage.  See BAUMERT ET AL., supra note 99, at 
46; see also Pacala & Socolow, Stabilization Wedges, supra note 104, at 970 tbl.1 (summa-
rizing currently feasible carbon-reducing energy strategies). 
146 See Lisa Lee, Green Group Asks Banks Not To Finance TXU Coal Plants, REUTERS, 
Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://ran.org/media_center/news_article/?uid=2210 (de-
scribing Rainforest Action Network’s campaign to prevent private banks from financ-
ing TXU’s planned expansion). 
147 Steven Mufson & David Cho, Energy Firm Accepts $45 Billion Takeover:  Buyers 
Made Environmental Pledge, WASH. POST, Feb 26, 2007, at A4. 
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far fewer high-mileage vehicles than those of the largest Japanese 
manufacturers.148  General Motors, which is expected to have the low-
est average fuel efficiency among major car manufacturers through 
2011, continues to market particularly inefficient cars such as the 
Hummer, and lobbies aggressively against increases in federal fuel-
efficiency standards.149  Taken together, such factors could leave GM 
more vulnerable to liability than Toyota or Honda. 
Nor, for that matter, are all oil and coal companies the same.  
Some, like British Petroleum, are clearly moving faster in acknowledg-
ing the gravity of climate change and in researching and developing 
alternative energy supplies.  British Petroleum was an industry leader 
in acknowledging the impacts of climate change as early as 1997.  
While other oil and coal companies continued to finance climate 
change skeptics and to oppose actively any emissions caps, British Pe-
troleum became a relatively progressive voice early in climate politics.  
One decade later, there is a plausible argument that those industry 
members yet to take the same steps as British Petroleum, that under-
invest in the research and development of alternatives, finance oppo-
sition to the regulation of carbon, and support efforts to obfuscate the 
public’s understanding of climate science, are not meeting current 
industry standards. 
D.  The Unforeseeable Plaintiff and Policy Limitations on Duty 
As suggested in the Introduction’s brief discussion of Palsgraf, 
courts have held that the duty to act with reasonable care does not ex-
tend to plaintiffs who were not among the categories of persons that 
foreseeably could have been harmed.  Judge Cardozo found that Mrs. 
Palsgraf was not within the foreseeable zone of risk created by the de-
fendant conductor’s negligent effort to help another passenger on to 
the train.  Thus, Mrs. Palsgraf, standing at the other end of the plat-
form, was owed no duty, and, as a result, no liability was found. 
At first glance, climate change claims would seem to give rise to 
numerous unforeseen plaintiffs.  The impact of climate change is 
148 See DON MACKENZIE, AUTOMAKER RANKINGS 2007:  THE ENVIRONMENTAL PER-
FORMANCE OF CAR COMPANIES 19 tbl.6 (2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
clean_vehicles/vehicles_health/automaker-rankings-2007.html (follow “Full Text of 
Report” hyperlink) (summarizing the percentage of the largest auto manufacturers’ 
fleets with a fuel economy of thirty or more miles per gallon). 
149 Justin Hyde, Lutz:  Fuel Rules Could Doom U.S. SUV, Truck Sales, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, Dec. 27, 2006, at 1A  (“More than any other automaker, GM has fought [fuel 
efficiency standards] . . . .”). 
  
2007] THE DUTY OF CARE IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 1781 
 
global and may cause both general and particular damages through-
out the world as a result of the activities of potential defendants.  In 
light of the emerging science and publicity around various climate 
impacts, however, even the most distant plaintiffs, whose wheat fields 
dry up for lack of rain or whose ski resorts close for lack of snow, can 
arguably no longer be labeled “unforeseeable.”  Today, GHG emis-
sions are known to put wheat farmers and others at risk (whereas a 
train conductor’s push on one passenger would still not put a distant 
passenger at foreseeable risk).  In short, as our understanding of cli-
mate change impacts increases, injury around the globe has become 
more foreseeable, including injuries felt more acutely by some plain-
tiffs (e.g., ski resort operators) than others.  No matter how geo-
graphically distant the plaintiffs may be, they are foreseeably in the 
zone of impact of the defendants’ activities.  The foreseeable zone of 
impact in the context of climate change, a global tort, is global, and 
the duty owed by defendant contributors to climate change arguably 
extends to damaged plaintiffs everywhere.  This presents a daunting 
problem of scale for the tort system.  But does it follow that tort law 
should treat a duty to everyone as a duty to no one? 
Another approach focuses on when not to impose a duty for ex-
plicit policy reasons.  Even if the defendant owes a duty of care to a 
party and has breached that duty, courts may decline to recognize the 
duty out of policy concerns.150  In most of these cases, the courts reject 
liability out of concern that the scale of liability will be so large as to 
run counter to public policy—either because it could destroy an in-
dustry or could result in an endless scope of liability.  For purposes of 
understanding climate-related claims, these policy-based limitations 
on duty may be helpfully evaluated in two categories—those relating 
to extending liability to a large group of potentially distant plaintiffs 
(what we call the “omnipresent plaintiff” problem) and those relating 
to purely economic losses. 
1.   The Omnipresent Plaintiff and Global Environmental Torts 
Courts have denied liability in some cases out of an apparent con-
cern that damages, or the number of potential plaintiffs, may be so 
great as to make the cases inappropriate for tort adjudication—either 
because the burden on defendants would be too great or because a 
150 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 22, at 718.  This is sometimes described as a 
“no duty” doctrine. 
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response is better left to the legislature.  Thus for example, in Strauss 
v. Belle Realty Co.,151 concern over bankrupting Consolidated Edison, a 
public utility, persuaded the court to refuse to impose liability for a 
tenant injured from tripping when he lost electricity.  As Goldberg 
and Zipursky describe, 
[t]he driving force behind the decision was . . . the court’s concern 
about the burden that would be imposed on New York’s major electrical 
supplier if it permitted ordinary negligence liability for all the harm that 
was caused by the blackout.  “No duty” is simply a conclusory label for 
that policy rationale.
152
In a different context, a number of courts have refused to extend li-
ability to third parties harmed by handguns, holding that these suits 
are not justiciable and are better resolved by legislatures.153
In the climate change context, we expect that courts may at first 
blush believe that the scale and range of damages are too great to im-
pose a duty on defendants.  As suggested above, however, a closer 
analysis of climate change might lead courts to reconsider.  To be 
sure, if all the damages inflicted by climate change were imposed on 
the underlying companies, one could expect significant bankruptcies 
of utilities, energy providers, and other companies critical to the 
economy.  However, such outcomes may be mitigated in ways other 
than dismissing the entire lawsuit.  For example, courts could limit li-
ability to the percentage of climate change attributable to the defen-
dants in the case. Moreover, the limits of any defendant’s negligence, 
and thus its liability, could be constrained to the extent that it has de-
veloped carbon-efficient operations.  Liability could also be bounded 
by determining a baseline of what levels of emissions would be “rea-
sonable” under the circumstances.  Emissions below that baseline 
would entail no liability.  Potential defendants could thus avoid liabil-
ity in the future by investing in climate-friendly operations or tech-
nologies. 
151 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985). 
152 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 22, at 719. 
153 E.g., Bloxham v. Glock, Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); City of Chi. 
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001); see also Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 
406 F. Supp. 2d 205, 271-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (assessing the justiciability of a public nui-
sance suit for global warming, and ultimately dismissing the claims). 
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2.  Economic Losses 
Courts have also frequently found that no duty exists in cases 
brought by plaintiffs who have suffered only economic loss without 
any physical damage to a proprietary interest.154  In Louisiana ex rel. 
Guste v. M/V Testbank, for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed the limits of liability for a massive pentachlorophenol 
(PCP) spill in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet.155  The U.S. Coast 
Guard closed the outlet to navigation for nearly a month and tempo-
rarily suspended fishing, crabbing, shrimping, and other activities 
over a 400-hundred-square-mile area.  The impacts of the spill rippled 
through the Louisiana economy, and a wide variety of affected parties 
filed suit.156
The court upheld claims on behalf of those who had suffered a di-
rect physical loss to their own property, as well as those people, includ-
ing fishers, shrimpers, and crabbers, who directly exploited the now-
damaged ecosystem. The court dismissed other plaintiffs’ claims that 
were based solely on indirect economic losses emanating from con-
tracts or other business relationships that might have been affected by 
closure of the water way.  The court wrote: 
 Review of the foreseeable consequences of the collision of the [two 
ships] demonstrates the wave upon wave of successive economic conse-
quences and the managerial role plaintiffs would have us assume.  The 
vessel delayed in St. Louis may be unable to fulfill its obligations to haul 
from Memphis, to the injury of the shipper, to the injury of the buyers, 
to the injury of their customers.  Plaintiffs concede, as do all who attack 
the requirement of physical damage, that a line would need to be 
drawn—somewhere on the other side, each plaintiff would say . . . .
157
Although the majority of courts continue to follow the bright-line 
rule that plaintiffs owe no duty to those whose only injury is economic 
loss, others adopt a less restrictive view and analyze such cases as pre-
senting only a question of proximate cause and the foreseeability of 
economic injury.158
154 See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927). 
155 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). 
156 Id. at 1020-21. 
157 Id. at 1028; see also P.S. Atiyeh, Note, Economic Loss in the United States, 5 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 485, 488-90 (1985) (discussing the court’s policy concerns in Testbank). 
158 See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 112-
18 (N.J. 1985). 
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The “economic loss doctrine” is obviously relevant to climate 
change cases.  Just as in Testbank, the reverberations of climate change 
through local and regional economies are, and will be, substantial.  A 
severe drought that destroys the Great Plains wheat crop may affect 
bread makers, restaurants, and truckers.  Tort law would typically draw 
the bounds of liability around only those whose economic losses re-
sulted from a physical loss—in this example the wheat farmer—and 
not those whose economic losses arise only through contract or other 
financial relationships, such as the bread maker.  Although liability 
can be bounded by concepts of proximate cause, it can also be 
bounded in terms of duty:  by concluding that the defendants’ duty 
does not extend through the relationships of the economy to plaintiffs 
who have suffered no direct physical injury. 
Although application of the economic loss doctrine may, in fact, 
limit the types of plaintiffs who can bring a climate-related tort suit, it 
may perversely embolden courts to find liability where there is a 
physical harm. Courts facing climate change complaints may initially 
view them as unmanageable and limitless, given that so many people 
and interests are affected either directly or indirectly by climate 
change.  Courts might recognize, however, that the economic loss 
doctrine already provides a convenient and reasonable approach to 
setting limits on climate claims.  Wheat farmers could bring their 
claims, but bread makers would be barred. 
IV.  PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS 
In products liability cases, liability is premised either on allega-
tions that a product is defective or that there has been a failure to 
warn of a foreseeable injury.  Product defects are further divided into 
two categories:  manufacturing defects and design defects.  Each of 
these bases for products liability is discussed in turn below.159
A.  Manufacturing Defect 
Manufacturing defects are those that occur because the particular 
product was manufactured incorrectly—for example, because some-
thing went wrong on the production line or imperfections weakened 
the material from which the product was made.  In such cases, a par-
ticular car or other product is determined to be flawed when com-
159 For a discussion of products liability claims in the climate context, see 
Grossman, supra note 23, at 42-46. 
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pared to the exact same car or product.  Where such a manufacturing 
defect is found, most courts apply strict liability to the defendant. 
Manufacturing defect theories are unlikely to form the basis for 
any climate litigation, because climate litigation will not be premised 
on one flawed or unsafe product, but rather on the unreasonableness 
of whole product lines (such as gasoline or SUVs). 
B.  Design Defect 
To succeed in a suit premised on design defect, a plaintiff must 
show that the product as designed is unreasonably dangerous and 
causes avoidable harm.  The manufacturer’s duty in product design 
cases usually turns on the reasonable foreseeability of the product’s 
potential risks, the product’s benefits, and the costs of alternative, less 
risky designs.  According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a product 
is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a rea-
sonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a prede-
cessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.
160
The inquiry into the “reasonable” safety of a product is essentially 
a risk-utility comparison between alternative designs—equivalent to 
the risk-utility inquiry made under a negligence theory.161  In other 
words, a defect exists where the costs of a safer alternative product de-
sign are less than the foreseeable avoidable injuries.162  Society values 
some risk in products—for example, faster cars may be less safe but a 
risk-utility balance might still favor cars that go faster than twenty 
miles per hour.  Yet we could imagine an automobile design—say a 
Formula One race car—that would be deemed unsafe when marketed 
for regular driving on public roads. 
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). 
161 See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,  525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Or. 1974) 
(“[W]hether the doctrine of negligence . . . or strict liability is being used to impose 
liability, the same process is going on in each instance, i.e., weighing the utility of the 
article against the risk of its use.”).  For general discussions of the risk-utility analysis 
performed in design defect cases, see Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit 
Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609 (1995); David G. Owen, Risk-
Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239 (1997); and Paul 
Rheingold, The Risk/Utility Test in Product Cases, 18 TRIAL LAW. Q. 49 (1987). 
162 See generally David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness:  “Micro-
Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (1997) (seeking to clarify the nature 
of this balancing test). 
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The question raised by climate change is not whether some auto-
mobiles are designed to be too fast for our roadways, but whether they 
are designed to be too inefficient.  It is not the miles per hour, but the 
miles per gallon that would be questioned in a climate change con-
text.  Thus, if cars that carry four people can do so with 40 or more 
miles per gallon, would an alternative design (of a Humvee, for ex-
ample) that gets less than ten miles per gallon ever be considered to 
pose an unreasonable risk to third parties? 
The key to demonstrating a design defect is to show that a reason-
able alternative exists that could make the product safer.  At least as of 
today, a reasonably safer design arguably exists for most cars in the 
form of hybrid technology.  The design is known to most manufactur-
ers and would reduce emissions from most classes of vehicles, with lit-
tle or no loss of performance.  Thus, this is not a case where an alter-
native design is impractical or unavailable.  The remaining question is 
whether the costs of requiring hybrid technology (or an equivalent al-
ternative technology) outweigh the societal benefits of reducing the 
emissions that cause climate change.163
The requirement that the risk be foreseeable in cases based on ei-
ther a design defect or a failure to warn does not seem to be a sub-
stantial bar to bringing a claim—at least not in the future.  As noted 
above, some of the risks of climate change are clear now, and we ex-
pect more risks to be clearer in the future.  Moreover, manufacturers 
in products liability cases may be liable for the foreseeable impacts of 
163 Some courts review a larger number of factors in determining a design defect 
than those mentioned in the simple risk-utility analysis described above.  These factors 
typically include the following:  (1) the usefulness (or utility) of the product to the 
user and society; (2) the likelihood that the product will cause injury and the serious-
ness of that injury; (3) the availability of a safer substitute product that provides the 
same utility; (4) the manufacturer’s ability to make the product safe without destroying 
its utility or making it too expensive; (5) the user’s ability to avoid the risk of injury by 
the exercise of care in using the product; (6) the user’s anticipated awareness of the 
dangers inherent in the product, either because of general knowledge or because of 
product warnings; and (7) the manufacturer’s ability to spread the loss by passing the 
costs on through the market price or through insurance.  See, e.g., Akee v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1132 (D. Haw. 2003); Labelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. 
Supp. 2d 508, 515 n.4 (D.S.C. 2001); Smith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 819 So. 2d 1258, 1263 
(Miss. 2002); see also John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 
MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (proposing the consideration of these additional factors).  
These expanded factors would not significantly change the analysis from the simpler 
cost-benefit analysis described in the text.  Cf. supra text accompanying note 117 (dis-
cussing the inherent difficulty of precisely defining the scope of duty in the negligence 
context). 
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their products, even to third parties who are not specifically using the 
product.  Thus, an Ohio court in a handgun case concluded: 
A duty of care for the protection of a plaintiff against an unreasonable 
risk of injury is owed to all people “to whom injury may reasonably be 
anticipated[.]”  A concern arises with less foreseeable plaintiffs when a 
defendant breaches a duty to one group of plaintiffs and also causes in-
jury as a result to another group of plaintiffs to whom a foreseeable risk 
of injury might or might not have been created at the time of the origi-
nal negligent act.  Under Ohio tort law, “[t]he existence of duty largely 
depends on the forseeability [sic] of the injury.”  . . . In this matter, the 
question is whether a reasonably prudent gun manufacturer should have 
anticipated an injury to the Plaintiffs as a probable result of manufactur-
ing, marketing, and distributing a product with an alleged negligent de-
sign.
164
The plaintiff shot with the gun was not the product’s user, but 
rather the third-party victim of the product’s use.  Similarly, extending 
the duty in a climate change claim based on a design-defect theory 
may depend on the analysis of the foreseeability of third-party victims 
injured by the product’s use.165
C.  Failure To Provide Adequate Warnings 
In a “duty to warn” case, the plaintiffs must show a breach of a 
duty to warn of the dangers of the product—based on the assumption 
that a proper warning would have prevented the harm—and that the 
lack of warning made the product unsafe for use.  According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, a product is 
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the fore-
seeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the 
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders 
the product not reasonably safe.
166
In a case concerning the contamination of wells by the gasoline 
additive MTBE, the court addressed the application of the duty to 
warn in cases brought by third parties.167  The plaintiff’s harm was suf-
164 White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828-29 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (quot-
ing Gedeon v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 190 N.E. 924, 926 (1934) and Commerce & Indus. Ins. 
Co. v. City of Toledo, 543 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (1989)). 
165 For further discussion of plaintiff foreseeability, see supra Part III.D. 
166 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB., § 2(c) (1998). 
167 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prod. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 
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fered as a result of gas spills and MTBE leaching into groundwater, 
not the specific use of gas by the plaintiff.  Nonetheless, the court ex-
plained: 
 In cases brought against manufacturers and suppliers for injuries re-
sulting from the use of hazardous materials or other unreasonably dan-
gerous products, courts have generally held that such manufacturers owe 
a duty to warn foreseeable users of the latent dangers of the product.  
Some courts have also held that the duty to warn extends to “third per-
sons exposed to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm by the fail-
ure to warn.”
168
Thus, as in design-defect claims, the fact that climate change 
plaintiffs are not the intended users of the product would not by itself 
bar a claim based on a failure to warn.  Whether the duty to warn ex-
tends to such third-party victims would depend on the analysis of the 
foreseeability of the injury to such third parties.  Once again, as cli-
mate impacts become clearer, so too does the foreseeability of injury 
from carbon-emitting products. 
V.  NUISANCE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS 
Most of the tort cases thus far have been brought primarily on 
public nuisance grounds, which present different, and likely smaller, 
burdens for establishing liability than do claims based on negligence 
theories.  Unlike negligence actions that focus on the unreasonable 
conduct of the defendant, nuisance claims require an unreasonable 
interference with private property or, in the case of public nuisance, 
rights common to the general public.  Private nuisance is defined as 
an activity that substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use 
and enjoyment of land.169  Public nuisance is defined as “an unreason-
able interference with a right common to the general public.”170
In both types of actions, the focus is on the nature, severity, and 
reasonableness of the interference.  In the context of pollution, for 
example, the defendants may not be negligent in the creation of pol-
lution—pollution is frequently an inevitable byproduct of reasonable 
593 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
168 Id. at 625 (citations omitted) (quoting McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances 
Co., 181 N.E.2d 430, 433 (1962)). 
169 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979) (defining “private nui-
sance”); see also Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(clarifying that the interference must be “substantial” and “unreasonable” to constitute 
a private nuisance). 
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). 
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conduct.  In this sense, utilities or automobile manufacturers are in-
tentionally causing harm to neighboring property owners.  The issue 
becomes whether the extent of pollution and its impact on the 
neighbors (or, in public nuisance, on the public’s interests) are un-
reasonable.  The defendant’s negligence or fault need not be shown; 
the plaintiff must show only that the interference is unreasonable un-
der the circumstances.171
A.  Nuisance 
As noted above, the basis of liability in nuisance is that an inten-
tional activity (for example, pollution) leads to an unreasonable inter-
ference in another’s property interest (or, in the case of public nui-
sance, to a public interest).  As Justice Cardozo observed, 
[n]uisance as a concept of the law has more meanings than one.  The 
primary meaning does not involve the element of negligence as one of 
the essential factors.  One acts sometimes at one’s peril.  In such circum-
stances, the duty to desist is absolute whenever conduct, if persisted in, 
brings damage to another.  Illustrations are abundant.  One who emits 
noxious fumes or gases day by day in the running of his factory may be 
liable to his neighbor though he has taken all available precautions.  He 
is not to do such things at all, whether he is negligent or careful.
172
If Cardozo had had the last word, climate change cases based on 
nuisance would be straightforward.  Defendants would owe a duty not 
to interfere with others’ use and enjoyment of their property.  Under 
this approach, the defendant utilities in Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power, to the extent they could be shown to have harmed the interest 
of private landowners due to their contribution to climate change, 
would be clearly liable.  However, more modern approaches to nui-
sance, particularly involving pollution, have required the interference 
to be both intentional and “unreasonable.”173  This reasonableness in-
quiry is often an inquiry into the relative social utility of the defen-
dant’s activity that leads to the nuisance as compared to the value of 
171 Where there is no intent to conduct the activity that leads to the nuisance, a 
nuisance claim can still be based on negligence by the defendant—for example, negli-
gently failing to avoid the nuisance or negligently creating the conditions that cause 
the nuisance. 
172 McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 391-92 (N.Y. 1928) (citations 
omitted); see also Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 688 (N.C. 1953) (not-
ing—in the context of a claim regarding the emission of noxious gases—that a private 
nuisance may be created in the absence of negligence). 
173 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
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the property interest (or public right) that is harmed by the defen-
dant’s activity.  Thus, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the New York 
Court of Appeals refused to enjoin a nuisance (air pollution) caused 
by a cement company, finding that: 
The cement making operations of defendant have been found by the 
court at Special Term to have damaged the nearby properties of plain-
tiffs in these two actions. . . . The total damage to plaintiffs’ properties is, 
however, relatively small in comparison with the value of defendant’s 
operation and with the consequences of the injunction which plaintiffs 
seek.
174
Similarly, in allowing the continued operation of a large cattle 
feedlot against allegations of nuisance by the neighboring homeown-
ers, the Idaho Supreme Court found in Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co. 
that: 
[I]n a nuisance action seeking damages the interests of the community, 
which would include the utility of the conduct, should be considered in 
the determination of the existence of a nuisance. . . . 
 The State of Idaho is sparsely populated and its economy depends 
largely upon the benefits of agriculture, lumber, mining and industrial 
development.  To eliminate the utility of conduct and other factors listed 
by the trial court from the criteria to be considered in determining 
whether a nuisance exists . . . would place an unreasonable burden upon 
these industries.
175
Although the Boomer and Carpenter cases differ in their ultimate 
treatment of plaintiffs’ claims,176 they both reflect the social-utility ap-
proach found in many pollution-related nuisance cases.177  This ap-
proach has been captured by the Restatement:  “An intentional invasion 
of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable 
174 Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (N.Y. 1970); see also Daniel 
A. Farber, The Story of Boomer:  Pollution and the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
STORIES 7 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) (analyzing the continued 
relevance of Boomer). 
175 701 P.2d 222, 227-28 (Idaho 1985). 
176 In Boomer, the plaintiffs were denied an injunction but awarded damages, while 
in Carpenter the plaintiffs were denied any remedy. 
177 See, e.g., Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1927) (“The very 
right on which the injured party stands in such cases is a quantitative compromise be-
tween two conflicting interests.”); Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 
968 (N.Y. 1977) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (applying the social-utility reasoning from 
Boomer). 
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if . . . the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s con-
duct . . . .”178
The social-utility inquiry in a nuisance claim tracks closely Judge 
Learned Hand’s BPL formula for negligence.  Thus, the trends in cli-
mate science that have demonstrated the increasingly grave conse-
quences of climate change, on the one hand, and the emergence of 
new and more cost-effective technologies to avoid climate change, on 
the other, would push a social-utility analysis toward liability in nui-
sance actions just as it would in actions based on negligence.179  As the 
potential economic and social costs of climate change mount, and as 
the costs of addressing carbon emissions decline (or, at most, rise at a 
lower rate), the relative social utility, and thus the reasonableness, of 
nuisance-creating activities also declines.  At some point, we would 
expect this social-utility inquiry to tip toward a finding of liability. 
Nuisance (and public nuisance) cases relating to climate change 
will also raise questions of whether a duty not to harm landowners is 
geographically limited to some extent.  In the quintessential nuisance 
claim, one neighbor’s emissions harm the neighboring landowner’s 
fields.  In contrast, climate change litigation may present plaintiffs and 
defendants who are geographically quite distant.  Courts could dismiss 
such cases on the theory that no duty is owed to plaintiffs so distant 
(or, alternatively, that the emissions were not the proximate cause of 
the damage), but in general courts are increasingly likely to avoid 
such a formulaic approach in favor of a more general discussion of 
the foreseeability of the plaintiff.  As discussed above, even distant 
plaintiffs could be viewed as foreseeable, given the global nature of 
climate change.180
B.  Public Nuisance 
The analysis is largely similar, although not identical, for public 
nuisance.  Courts frequently invoke a social-utility balancing test in 
evaluating those claims, as well.  According to the Restatement: 
Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a 
public right is unreasonable include the following: 
178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). 
179 See supra Part III.A. 
180 See supra Part III.D. 
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 (a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the 
public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or 
the public convenience, or 
 (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statue, ordinance or ad-
ministrative regulation, or 
 (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a 
permanent or long-lasting effect, and as the actor knows or has reason to 
know, has a significant effect upon the public right.
181
Given the widespread, serious, and long-lasting impacts that are 
increasingly attributed to climate change, it does not seem a stretch to 
argue that it constitutes a “significant interference” with the public’s 
welfare.182  Indeed, the commentary to the Restatement section notes 
that “[s]ome courts have shown a tendency . . . to treat significant in-
terferences with recognized aesthetic values or established principles 
of conservation of natural resources as amounting to a public nui-
sance.”183  The significance of the interference in a public nuisance 
may be analyzed just as the unreasonableness of the interference in a 
private nuisance action (i.e., with reference to the relative benefits of 
the activity creating the public nuisance as compared to the damage 
caused by the nuisance).184
Demonstrating the breach of duty for a public nuisance case is 
significantly easier than for cases premised on either negligence or 
products liability.  Under many formulations, a public nuisance can be 
demonstrated where the defendant “knowingly contributes to” a pub-
lic nuisance.  This requires that the defendant have knowledge that its 
actions may lead to the nuisance—for example, climate change—but 
it does not require that the underlying conduct be measured against 
any objective standard of reasonableness. 
This relatively low burden of proving that defendants are know-
ingly contributing to climate change surely played a part in the deci-
sion of the attorneys general to base their climate claims on theories 
181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2). 
182 See Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance:  
Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 439-49 
(2005) (analyzing the legal basis for a public nuisance claim based on global warm-
ing); see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1972) (discussing envi-
ronmental damage as a basis for public nuisance suits under federal common law).  
But see Bruce Ledewitz & Robert D. Taylor, Law and the Coming Environmental Catastro-
phe, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 599, 615 (1997) (asserting that nuisance 
law cannot serve as the basis for imposing liability for global warming). 
183 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1979). 
184 See supra Part III.A (discussing utility balancing in the context of negligence). 
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of public nuisance.  In Connecticut v. American Electric Power, for exam-
ple, the complaint alleges that each defendant knowingly contributed 
to climate change and cites as support particular steps or pronounce-
ments each defendant has made to address climate change.185  In this 
way, modest steps to study climate change or to reduce emissions were 
actually used against the utilities to show that they knew and acknowl-
edged climate change would have significant adverse impacts.  The 
same is true in the California Complaint.186
The public nuisance cases have an additional advantage with re-
spect to the required proof of the defendant’s conduct.  In some ju-
risdictions, the defendant’s conduct need only “contribute” to a nui-
sance; it need not be the sole or even a primary cause of the nuisance.  
Even a relatively small contribution can be sufficient for a finding of 
joint and several liability.187  Thus, the fact that the defendant utilities 
in Connecticut v. American Electric Power or the defendant automobile 
manufacturers in General Motors Corp. contribute only 2.3%188 and 
9.0%189 of global CO2 emissions, respectively, does not bar suit.  Under 
the plaintiffs’ theory of the case, the obligation is not to contribute—
even slightly—to the nuisance.190  In addition, the states’ claims of 
public nuisance are not premised on any one specific weather event, 
so they may not be required to show that climate change has resulted 
in a specific hurricane or drought—just that, generally, over time cli-
mate change may have certain impacts (e.g., declines in snowpack, 
more intense storms, and warmer temperatures). 
Although public nuisance cases do present some distinct advan-
tages, they also present some obstacles peculiar to public nuisance.  
The broad, public nature of the interests that lie at the heart of the 
public nuisance suits likely influenced the district court’s invocation of 
the political question doctrine in the AEP case.  In addition, to invoke 
185 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 42. 
186 California Complaint, supra note 21. 
187 Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1, 9-10 (1881); see also People v. Gold Run Ditch 
& Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1158 (Cal. 1884) (applying the holding of Woodyear); Pawa & 
Krass, supra note 182, at 450-55 (applying these and other cases to an analysis of joint 
and several liability in the context of a nuisance case for global warming). 
188 See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 42, at 26 (estimating the defendants’ 
combined annual CO2 emissions at 650 million tons); BAUMERT ET AL., supra note 99, 
at 4 (reporting global annual output of CO2 emissions at 28 billion tons). 
189 California Complaint, supra note 21, at 3.  Note also that CO2 emissions repre-
sent only 77% of the global warming potential of all GHG emissions.  BAUMERT ET AL., 
supra note 99, at 6. 
190 See Pawa & Krass, supra note 182, at 450-55. 
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public nuisance as a theory, private plaintiffs will have to prove par-
ticularized damages that are different than those suffered by the gen-
eral public.  The private land trusts that joined the AEP case, for ex-
ample, alleged specific harms to their particular properties; the court 
has yet to evaluate their claims of particularized injury.191
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has explained, establishing both the duty of care 
and the class of persons to whom that duty extends will be fundamen-
tal to any successful climate litigation in tort.  Yet these issues have 
been largely overlooked to date.  Our analysis suggests that changes 
over time in our understanding of climate change impacts are increas-
ing the foreseeable costs of GHG emissions.  At the same time, alter-
natives to inefficient technologies or practices are increasingly well 
known, and the avoidance costs are declining.  This suggests that the 
relative risk-utility balance of climate-changing activities is shifting, 
and with that shift comes an increased likelihood that a defendant’s 
activities or products will be found to present an unreasonable risk of 
foreseeable injury.  Whether under theories of negligence, nuisance, 
or products liability, such trends in the risk-utility ratio are moving to-
ward a finding of liability. 
The focus on duty also helps us to look beyond a sector-wide ap-
proach to defendants—for example, all utilities, oil and gas produc-
ers, or automobile manufacturers—to a focus on those companies 
within a sector that are lagging behind the industry leaders in re-
sponding to climate change.  Although initial tort actions have been 
suits against broad groups of utilities or automobile manufacturers 
with little differentiation, the next generation of tort cases may take a 
more nuanced approach to naming defendants.  In the future, those 
companies whose approach to climate change is behind that of others 
in their industry run the risk of being singled out in tort actions.  In-
quiries into the reasonableness of a company’s operations or products 
turn into inquiries about how they compare to those of others.  In this 
way, today’s industry laggards may be tomorrow’s climate defendants. 
191 For a discussion of the problems associated with standing, see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C & cmt. a (1979); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 
1438 (2007) (holding that state governments have standing to sue); Korsinsky v. EPA, 
No. 05 Civ. 859(NRB), 2005 WL 2414744, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005) (dismissing 
the claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on sensitivity to pollution and 
fear of pollution were not sufficiently imminent). 
